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Introduction
This thesis is the compilation of two independent parts. Part one investigates 
learning behaviour in oligopoly using experimental methodology. On the basis 
of a series of experiments1,1 analyse learning adjustment when firms act in an 
economic environment characterised by imperfect information about demand 
conditions. Furthermore, in this specific environment, the same market is 
repeated a finite number of periods and the factor in common between those 
markets is the fact that firms gain experience over time.
This part arrives at interesting conclusions concerning some questions 
often addressed by the economic literature on learning. The first problem 
is to test whether agents follow a learning rule in their decision making. 
The next question concerns the role played by factors like the quantity of 
information, the number of firms, the definition of firms’ incentives and the 
product differentiation, in the firms’ learning process. Finally, I check how 
those factors determine the probability that firms’ strategies tend to converge 
either to the cooperative or to the non-cooperative equilibrium.
The results of part one do not agree with the conclusion of oligopoly 
theory that firms tend to the cooperative equilibrium as the game is played 
repeatedly, even if they do not cooperate explicitly.
The second part is a detailed study and discussion of a recent case of EEC 
competition policy that concerns Tetra Pak, one of the world leaders in the 
carton packaging for liquid food. Tetra Pak makes cartons for packing both 
fresh or non-aseptic and aseptic liquids.
This case arrived at the European Commission in 1983 and it is still un­
1 These experiments were run through a local computer network and they are baaed in 
two programs written in Turbo Pascal. The programs are available on request.
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der investigation. The 1991 decision of the Commission was the consequence 
of some information that seemed to prove Tetra Pak’s anti-competitive be­
haviour. In its decision “Tetra Pak IF  [1991], the EC Commission charged 
Tetra Pak with having taken advantage of its dominant position in the aseptic 
sector to com m it  abuses on the related sector of non-aseptics.
Part two investigates the Tetra Pak case under the prisma of dominance 
and tries to test the Commission’s decision. Using empirical techniques and 
working with the information available from the Commission’s decision, I 
arrive at some results concerning Tetra Pak’s dominant position in one of the 
two sectors in which it participates, the non-aseptic. I test the hypothesis 
that Tetra Pak’s dominant position in the non-aseptic sector is due to the 
firm’s abusive practices in the other sector, the sector for aseptics.
The link between parts I and II is learning. In the first part, firms learn 
about other firms and the economic environment, whereas in the second part 
it is the environment - represented by competition authorities - that tries to 
learn about the behaviour of firms.
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Part I
Experimental Evidence of 
Learning Behaviour in 
Oligopoly

1.1 Introduction
This part investigates learning behaviour in oligopoly using experimental 
methods. In particular, it focuses on the analysis of learning behaviour when 
firms have imperfect information about demand conditions. Trying to test 
learning behaviour, I ran a series of experiments that give some interesting 
results along the lines suggested by the literature on learning. More specif­
ically, I focus on models in which the same oligopolistic market is repeated 
a finite number of periods and the only link between successive markets is 
provided by the fact that the agents acquire experience over time as the game 
is played.
Kirman [1975, 1983] and, later, Brousseau and Kirman [1991] put em­
phasis on the fact that agents act with limited and mis-specified models and 
that they try to learn from their experience about the precise specification of 
reality. Learning is put in a dynamic setting in which the outcomes observed 
by the agents are influenced by their actions and these actions may be in­
fluenced by the learning process. There are three main questions to answer 
in this type of scenarios. First, whether there is any learning process at all 
and if so, if there is any convergence of the learning process and how the con­
vergence is influenced by such different economic factors as, say, the degree 
of differentiation between the products offered by the firms, the number of 
firms or the information available to them. Second, the extent to which firms 
are able to infer from their observations that they are dealing with strategic 
behaviour and if so how this would affect the convergence of the learning 
process. Third, to test the least squares method as a possible learning rule 
for the mis-specified model.
The present part aims at answering these questions. I run a series of
7
experiments in which I assume that firms have imperfect information about 
the specification of the market demand.
The next two sections make a brief review of the recent literature on learn­
ing in oligopoly and of the main contributions of experimental economics to 
oligopoly theory. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the economic model on which the 
experiments are based. Section 6 describes the organization of the experi­
ments. The main results are discussed in section 7. The conclusions of this 
first part are presentend in section 8.
1.2 The Theory of Learning in Oligopoly
Based on the analysis of Cyert and DeGroot [1971, 1973, 1974] and Arrow and 
Green [1973], Kirman [1975] considers a duopoly problem in which firms are 
in error in the sense that they specify an incomplete model and add a random 
error term. Cyert and DeGroot [1971] analysed a duopoly in which one of the 
firms, which is not sure about the extent of its rival’s willingness to match 
a price increase, establishes a prior probability distribution on the maximal 
price that may be matched. The firm then revises its distribution in the light 
of its experienced observations. In later work3 and always in a duopoly, they 
analyse a situation in which each firm has a coefficient of cooperation, in 
the sense that each one of them maximises not only its own profit but also a 
fraction of the profit of its competitor. Each firm forms a prior distribution on 
the values of its rival’s maximum level of cooperation. The process moves from 
a non cooperative equilibrium to a joint maximisation position. A different 
approach is suggested by Arrow and Green [1973]. They consider that firms
2See Cyert and DeGroot [1973].
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make inferences about the true model they face. Their model has a true 
joint profit function for all firms and each firm has a personal model different 
from the true one. Cyert and DeGroot [1974] use a rational expectations 
model. According to their analysis, the equilibrium value of the economic 
model should coincide with the weighted average of firms’ expectations about 
that value. In these models there may be no convergence at all, convergence 
to an equilibrium that is unrelated to the ‘true’ equilibrium, or, in specific 
cases, convergence to the true equilibrium. Kirman [1975] observes that3:
“Provided the effect of the opponent’s price is not too important in deter­
mining demand in the true model, the firms proceed by learning about an 
‘incorrect’ model but arrive at a ‘correct’ solution.”
The analysis made by Gates et al. [1977, 1978] introduces a different 
learning rule. The agents play a game with a minimum of information. Firms 
vary production levels according to the following adjustment process: each 
firm bases its new production decision entirely upon its knowledge of its own 
previous production levels and profits. It has no knowledge of its true payoff 
function. As a result, “the market evolves towards an equilibrium state for 
any initial state”. Furthermore, they conclude that “all equilibrium states are 
characterised by the vanishing of the Jacobian of the payoff functions of the 
market game, and implies convergence to equilibrium”. A common element 
of these analyses is that firms use specific rules for learning but these rules 
are not optimal since at any point in time their beliefs are revealed to be 
incorrect.
sThis result is one of the main points of reference of the work presented here.
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A later approach4 assumes that firms choose their strategies as a contin­
uous function of their competitors’ previous period strategies to maximise 
their discounted infinite sequence of profits. Equilibrium may not exist in all 
cases.
The models which are used to describe oligopolistic situations should take 
into account the uncertainty in the structure of the economic system. This 
is pointed out in various ways by a number of authors. For example, Marcet 
and Sargent [1989] investigate a situation where the agents update their per­
ceived law of motion by least squares. They apply the ‘differential equation 
approach’ but their framework fails to apply to models which have either 
hidden state variables or private information, as used in other studies of con­
vergence of least squares learning. Kiefer and Nyarko [1989] go further on this 
line by using optimal control of a linear regression process with an unknown 
parameter, under an infinite horizon and discounted rewards5. They consider 
active6 learning and convergence of beliefs. In general, for any action process 
they show that there will be complete learning of the true parameter if the 
action process does not converge, and there may be some (probably incom­
plete) learning if the action process does converge. Moreover, they show that 
the optimal action process converges7.
4See Friedman [1968,1976] and Robson [1986] for more details. In a context of repeated 
games, Friedman and Samuelson [1990] focus on the matter of continuous reactions of 
players, but the scope of their analysis lies far from the aims of my experiments.
5See also Easley and Kiefer [1988].
6That is, a strategy which considers the information value of an action at each date.
7They show that it converges to the one-period optimal action under the long-run 
posterior distribution.
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The hypothesis of players with a mis-specified model may help to overcome 
some of the limitations of those models involving learning in oligopoly. This 
is because players, after learning for a period, may reject the mis-spedfied 
model and come to a correct specification. Moreover, the learning process 
may or may not converge but it may be that the final situation is not the 
solution of the true model but it is self sustaining. As an example of this 
approach, Brousseau and Kirman [1991] considered agents with limited and 
mis-spedfied models in a dynamic setting. One difficulty of this approach 
is that the outcomes are influenced by other firms’ actions and their own 
actions. Another difficulty is that actions may be influenced by the learning 
process. In their model, agents’ strategies do not converge to any equilibrium. 
This is not only a problem of mis-spedfication, but also a problem of players’ 
ignorance of the choice of the strategies played by their opponents. In other 
words, everything depends on the information available to the agents. This is 
explidtly expressed by Kalai and Lehrer [1992]. They require that, in order to 
have convergence to the Nash equilibrium, the truth should lie in the support 
of the agents’ beliefs and that the support of those beliefs should be the same 
for all agents. Nyarko [1989] also studies a situation where agents have a mis- 
spedfied model and arrives at different results. He shows that, in the case of 
a monopolist maximising a sum of discounted profits fadng a linear demand 
curve whose slope and intercept are unknown, actions and beliefs may cyde 
on every sample path. However, such behaviour is not possible if the agent’s 
model is correctly spedfied and, in that case, actions and beliefs necessarily 
converge.
As a result, there are definitely some facts that remain to be studied 
regarding learning by agents. Among the most important of them, I suggest
11
the amount of information that agents have concerning their environment, 
the objective function of the agents and, finally, the learning rule they use.
1.3 Testing Learning Behaviour
Experimental economics started in the 80’s as one of the most interesting 
methods to empirically test the results of economic theory. The use of lab­
oratory experimental methods in economics has developed into a powerful 
instrument of applied microeconomics. In particular, experimental meth­
ods have been applied to economic situations like imperfect competition and 
oligopoly8. Plott [1982] made experiments in monopoly to analyse the impor­
tance of the form of the market organization within which buyers and sellers 
interact, in determining market performance9. He concluded that market 
structure and the institutional environment are dramatically important.
By using oral auctions, Smith and Williams [1981] arrived to the con­
clusion that it is really difficult to reach any general conclusions about the 
comparative accuracy of the models. One of the results they reach is that 
when monopolists post prices, market behaviour is accurately captured by 
monopoly theory.
Oligopoly theory has also been tested by experiments. One of the main 
results is that a harmony of interest is not easily recognizable by oligopolists, 
and that perhaps agents automatically treat competitive situations as zero- 
sum games so that certain collusive outcomes predicted by oligopoly theory
«See Plott [1982], Smith and Williams [1981], Holt [1985] and Alger [1987].
9See also Smith [1976] and Plott [1979].
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never occur10.
Early experiments in oligopoly give subjects a profit table or its functional 
equivalent. The table contains the agents’ profits expressed as a function of 
his/her own price and the price of a competitor. This removes all strategic 
behaviour from the picture. Demand data privately held by buyers are re­
vealed to the seller. Four main conclusions are reached11. First, that full 
information about payoffs, symmetric payoffs, full information about oppo­
nents’ choices, and very long periods of interaction tend to facilitate collusive 
behaviour. Second, prices higher than the competitive ones are observed. 
Third, the consistent-conjectures equilibrium and not the Cournot equilib­
rium is the principle behind the observed behaviour12. Fourth, the upward 
bias of price posting occurs even when a large number of competitors exist. 
Posted prices facilitate the maintenance of prices at higher than competitive 
equilibrium levels but do not guarantee it13.
The theoretical origin of a series of applied analyses14 on learning is to 
be found in Brousseau and Kirman [1991]. They analyse the dynamics of
10See Plott [1982] .
u See Plott (1982).
13This is asserted by Holt [1985]. He specifies a consistent-conjectures equilibrium by 
using Bresnahan’s [1981] condition of consistency in a homogeneous-product duopoly in 
which quantity is the strategic variable, variable costs are zero and industry demand is 
linear. He explains that, although not explicitly dynamic, the consistent-conjectures equi­
librium approach is plausible because it predicts deviations from a static Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium that are qualitatively consistent with the data reported in several published 
laboratory experiments with university students being the ‘subjects’.
“ See Alger [1987].
14Through experiments and through simulations.
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learning in mis-spedfied models. This work is the starting point in testing 
situations in which agents are uncertain about their demand curve. One 
of the problems to be solved is the role of ordinary least squares16 in the 
presence of uncertain ty . One way of estimating the relation between two or 
more variables is to apply the method of least squares. Therefore, it makes 
sense to test if agents do actually use the least squares method in order to get 
additional information about the market. Rom a theoretical perspective, the 
conclusion in Brousseau and Kirman [1991] is that least squares learning is not 
stable. Even if agents' ideas of the uncertain parameters change as time goes 
by, they may not converge to any equilibrium. In the same line, Kiefer and 
Nyarko [1989] show that optimal policies are different from the least-squares 
policies and, thereafter, suggest an improvement over least-squares.
Closer to the analysis presented here, Chautard and Raby [1991] make an 
applied study about a specific model of demand in which players have imper­
fect information about demand and each player knows nothing but his/her 
own past. They also run a couple of experiments in which an artificial player 
plays againts human subjects. This artificial player fixes its strategy based 
on an algorithm that they describe as a good approach to a ‘clever attitude’. 
They explain that “of all equilibria obtained in the theoretical Brousseau and 
Kirman analysis, only the Bertrand-Nash solution appears to be the limit point 
for prices fixed by human b e in g s Concerning the method used by agents to 
fix their strategy, they note, “the experimental sessions, in which players re­
fused to apply the ordinary least squares method, have proved that it is not 
only adequate but also necessary for them to be free to fix prices by follow­
ing a specific algorithm. It is convenient not to abandon totally the idea that
16Also referred to as OLS or as the least-squares method.
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players apply the method of tâtonnement”.
Always on the basis of the Brousseau and Kirman [1991] model, Hopkins 
[1992] runs simulations trying a variety of learning algorithms, for the case of 
more than two firms and also looking at the least-squares learning with limited 
memory. On the OLS, the Brousseau and Kirman findings are, in general, 
confirmed. Prices do not converge to Nash equilibrium levels. Moreover, 
he analyses the human behaviour observed in some experiments where all 
agents seem to approach fairly dose to the Nash equilibrium price. He even 
introduces an algorithm that mimics that behaviour.
Another question going in the same direction is whether or not agents 
consdously show a strategic behaviour in inferring information, so that they 
may be able to change some mechanisms in the market and, maybe, converge 
to the optimal strategy. Do firms really behave strategically or do they just 
try to learn from the strategies of the past?
Going beyond the work of Brousseau and Kirman [1991], I test here learn­
ing behaviour in an oligopolistic market with product differentiation. Players 
know the results (own demands and profits) of their strategies and the strate­
gies of their rivals in the past. The test is based on five experiments with the 
use of a computing laboratory.
The economy is characterised by demand mechanisms that are not known 
by firms. Following the terminology used by Kirman [1975], I consider that 
there is a model which is a function of the firms’ dedsions every period. This 
model governing the demand is called the ‘true model’. The true model tested 
here is an oligopoly model with product differentiation.
I have run a number of oligopoly experiments to test the relevance of equi­
librium in oligopoly models. Some experiments have indicated that economic
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theory is not necessarily the only way to explain human behaviour even when 
the agents are aware of the concepts of game theory. Despite the critical 
attitude of some economists towards experimental economics16, I agree with 
Plott [1987] in that the role of experiments is to provide the foundation for 
making ‘educated guesses’. The purpose of experiments is to make the guess, 
in the light of experience, as informed as possible.
1.4 The M odel
There are n firms, offering a differentiated product during T  periods. Price 
is the only decision variable of each firm at each period.
Firm t ’s demand in period t is given by:
qit = a -  Ppit +  $ Pit (1.1)i*
where parameters a  and f3 represent, respectively, the intercept and the 
slope of the demand function. Both are fixed and constant17. In the exper­
iments, the values of these parameters are a — 500, fi = 3. The parameter 
6 indicates the effect of a firm’s rivals’ prices on the firm’s demand18. In
10Part of the critiques are based on the artificiality of the experiments, on the charac­
teristics of the participants and on the consequences of friendship between players for the 
results obtained from the experiments. It can be argued that economic theory is not free 
from similar problems.
17This model could similarly be written as: =  o' — 0(pit — c) +  (iff — c),
where prices are expressed as deviations from marginal cost with at = a — c[/9 — (n — 1)0] 
and 9  =  0/0.
l i6 =  0.14 in experiments 1,2,3 and 5. 6 = 0.4 in experiment 4.
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other words, it measures the degree of substitutability between the varieties 
produced by different firms.
The variety produced by each firm is technically similar to the rest of the 
varieties produced by the rest of the firms19. Firms are assumed to produce 
exactly what they can sell. I assume constant unit costs, c^ , which are common 
for all firms. In the experiments I set c,- = c = 40 monetary units.
The profit II,• of firm i in period t is given by:
Htt=  (At c)®( (i*2)
The procedure of the game is as follows: in each period t, firms decide their 
prices simultaneously and independently. At the beginning of each period, 
each firm updates its information with last period’s own demand and profit 
as well as the prices fixed by the firm’s rivals. All firms are equally informed 
about the rules of the game. The game is repeated a finite number T  of 
periods.
1.5 Equilibria
There are two types of equilibria for this model, the non-cooperative and the 
tacitly cooperative one.
1.5.1 The Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium
The non-cooperative solution of this game corresponds to the Bertrand-Nash 
equilibrium which is unique and equal to:
19Which implies equal unit cost for all firms.
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°  -1 )1 )*“ ~ 2 0 - e ( n - l ) ~ C+ f){2 -  („_ 1)|] (l3>
for i — l...n and t = l...n. The non-cooperative solution concept requires 
that each period t every firm maximizes its profit, given by equation (2), 
taking the decisions of the other firms as given. It corresponds to the best 
response of each firm to the decisions of the other firms.
Equilibrium profits that result from the non-cooperative solution are given
by:
p[a — c(0 — 0(n — l ) ) ] 3 ,
I i l =  [20 — $(n — l ) ] 3------------ ^ • _ C |  ( U )
1.5.2 The Joint Monopoly Equilibrium
The tadtly cooperative solution is given by the joint monopoly equilibrium 
which is:
Pit = 2 ( 0 - 0 ( n - l ) )  + 2 ^
This equilibrium supposes that firms act as a sole firm that produces n 
different varieties, so that each firm maximizes the total profits of the industry. 
Profits in the joint monopoly equilibrium are given by:
_  [a — c(0 — fl(n — l))]2 .
* “  4 [ 0 - 0 ( n - l ) ]  ' }
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1.6 Experimental Design and Organization
I organized five experiments at the Experimental Laboratory20 (LeeX) of 
the Universität Pompeu i Fabra in Barcelona (Spain). The players were 
students of that University21. All of them were economics students, with 
a clear majority of students from the third and fourth years of studies. It 
makes sense to assume that, to some extent, all players had some knowledge 
of oligopoly theory. No student played in more than one experiment.
The experiments were based on two programs written in Turbo Pascal, one 
for the players and one “master” program that controlled the whole economic 
system.
Table A contains a brief description of the experiments. The number of 
firms - n -, the degree of product differentiation - given by parameter 6 -, 
the information of firms - perfect, if they know the model of demand and the 
value of all parameters, and imperfect otherwise the mode in which agents 
were rewarded and the number of periods, are given for each experiment22.
20This laboratory is used exclusively to run experiments.
21To recruit players, a “call for volunteers” appeared a few days before each experiment 
in the hall of the Faculty of Economics and Law of the University. The announcement 
included information about the number of experiments, the duration of each one of them 
and the name of the organizer. Volunteers were asked to give the number of their identity 
card, their telephone number and sign down in a number of lists at the entrance of the 
experimental laboratory (it is used exclusively to run experiments). There was no talk of 
pregame collusion. The number of volunteers and their punctuality were remarkably high.
22Since firms are uncertain about demand and given that changes in other firms’ strate­
gies have a big effect on each firm’s demand, by choosing small values for parameter $ I 
intend to avoid increases in firms’ uncertainty that could be an obstacle to the learning 
process.
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T a b le  A
Description of the Experim ents
Ex. 1 Ex. 2 Ex. 3 Ex. 4 Ex. 5
Firms n = 5 n =  5 n = 5 n =  5 CO1!c
e 0 = 0*14 $ =  0.14 $ = 0.14 0 =  0.4 6 =  0.23
Inform, demand Imperfect Imperfect Perfect Imperfect Imperfect
Reward mode A mode B mode A mode A mode A
N. of periods n T =  20 T = 20 T =  20 T = 15
Agents were paid at the end of each experiment. I used two different 
modes of reward33.
M ode A consisted of a quantity equal to the equivalent of a firm’s accu­
mulated profits multiplied by an equivalence factor of 0.01 pesetas for each 
unit of accumulative profit along the T  periods.
M ode B consisted of a fixed quantity of 1000 pesetas plus an additional 
quantity calculated as a function of a firm’s accumulated profits. The pro­
portion was calculated on the basis of an equivalence factor of 0.006 pesetas 
for each unit of accumulative profit. Additionally, a quantity of 1000 pese­
tas was distributed proportionally between the two firms with the highest 
accumulative profits along the T  periods.
“ Merlo and Schotter [1992] emphasise the importance of the method of reward for the 
results of an experiment. With reference to Harrison [1989], Merlo and Schotter [1992] 
explain that the expected payoff function can influence the behaviour of subjects. In 
general, they remark this fact comparing a situation in which agents' rewards depend on 
their accumulated profits, with a situation in which these agents’ reward depend just on 
the profit they make in the last period. I have not considered this last alternative of reward 
in my experiments. My conjecture is that it would result in agents behaving irrationally 
or putting all effort on their learning until they arrived at the last period.
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In principle, mode A rewards each unit of profit more than mode B. On 
the contrary, mode B  is chosen to reward and encourage firms’ efforts to do 
better than their rivals34.
Each one of the five experiments was technically organized as follows:
1. There are n = 5 players in experiments 1-4 and n = 3 players in 
experiment 5.
2. Each player represents a firm in an industry.
3. Firms produce a differentiated product during T  periods25.
4. Each player sits in a separate cubicle with a personal computer.
5. All computers are connected through a local area network.
6. On a supplementary computer in this network, the master program is 
installed and controlls the whole experiment.
7. Each player independently chooses his/her price for each period which 
is then transmitted to the master program.
8. The master program reads the information and calculates demands and 
profits that correspond to the chosen prices.
9. The master sends back to each player’s screen the information on 
demand, profits and other players’ actions in the previous period.
10. With this information, players start the next period and decide on 
their next strategy.
11. The screen offers each player a *main menu’that can be used to call
MTbis way of rewarding agents is the line of a manager’s behaviour. The spirit of a 
firm’s manager «ima at making of its firm the best firm of the industry.
38ln  experim ents 1-4, firms know a priori that the number of periods that the industry 
exists is T = 20. Only in experiment 5 firms are told that the industry may end at any 
time.
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up information on past periods’ prices of other players, own demands and 
profits.
In each period, players were given a total of two minutes and a half to 
make their decisions. Within this interval of time, players could make any 
modification of their price decision. A clock on each player’s screen indicated 
the time passing.
Before the beginning of each experiment, players were given instructions 
on the technical functioning of the game although there was no preliminary 
play. Immediately afterwards, a sheet of paper containing the characteristics 
of the economic scenario simulated by the game and the instructions to follow 
were given to the players36.
When every player was sure to understand what the game was about, 
all screens were set at the ‘main menu’ which, among other information, 
indicated that the first period was already running.
This is how the ‘main menu’ - screen looks like:
a6The appendix contains a copy of the instructions given to the players in each 
experiment.
00 : 02 : 00
Main menu
Period number :1 
Price :
You can fix a new price with : "1"
You can use some help-facilities:
Summary of prices, demands and profits : "2"
Own prices and demands in a graph : "3"
Own prices and profits in a graph : "A"
Ordinary Least Squares estimation of demand : "5"
Prices of other firms in the past : "6"
A number on the right of an option indicates the key that should be
pressed in order for the option to be used. To fix a price, players had to
choose option 1 on the keyboard. Players had an unlimited possibility to
change their decisions before the end of each period.
At the end of each period, the message:
“Your price for period is : ‘p»<’
Please wait until the beginning of next period”
appeared on player i’s screen, where pa indicated the player’s choice for the 
i ’th period.
A few seconds later, the next period would start. Option 2 of the main 
menu gave each player his own demands and profits in past periods. Firms 
could use option 6 to learn the prices set by all o ther firms in the past.
Therefore, each firm could use a rule of three to learn the evolution of 
demand and profits for each one of its rivals. However, this would imply that
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players were expecting to have the same true model, which is not obvious in 
any sense.
Players were offered additional information through a number of graphs. 
Options 3 and 4 offered each player a plot of his/her own profits and 
dem ands37 againts the player’s corresponding pricing decisions. Option 5 
offered each player an OLS estim ation of a demand function based on the 
observations of demand and prices of the firm in the past.
Players were offered perfect information on the mode of payment that 
corresponded to the experiment in which they were taking part.
Table B presents Bertrand and joint monopoly equilibrium prices, de­
mands and profits for the five experiments :
37That correspond to the true demand function.
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Ta b le  B
Equilibria
Param eters Bertrand- Nash Joint Monopoly
Experiment 1
n =  5 
0 =  0.14
r  =  2o
r  = 114 
9, = 221.8 
n, = 16413
Pi =  122.5 
9, =  201 
n, = 16582
Experiment 2
n = 5 
6 =  0.14 
T =  20
Pi = 114 
g, = 221.8 
n, = 16413
Pi =  122.5 
9, =  201 
II< = 16582
Experiment 3
n = 5 
6 = 0.14 
T =  20
Pi =  114 
qi = 221.8 
n< = 16413
Pi =  122.5 
9, =  201 
Hi =  16582
Experiment 4
n = 5 
0 = 0.4 
T = 20
Pi = 140.9 
9t = 302.7 
Hi = 30542
Pi =  198.6 
9i =222 
H, =  35209
Experiment 5
n = 3 
6 = 0.23 
T -  15
Pi =  112 
9, = 216 
Ui =  15552
Pi =  118.7 
9, =  199 
Ui = 15661
Observe that, in experiment 4, a higher value of 6 results in a higher 
equilibrium price, demand and profits as compared to experiments 1-3 where 
varieties are more differentiated. The reason is that a higher 6 is translated 
in higher strategic complementarity, in the sense that a more aggressive38 
strategy by the competitors raises a firm’s marginal profit.
In experiment 5 there are three firms instead of five39.
MIn the sense of charging high prices.
2#I set 0 =  0.23, so that a unit price increase by a firm’s rivals in this experiment has the 
same effect as a unit price increase in experiments 1, 2 and 3. Note that 0.14 • 5 =  0.23 * 3.
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My goal is to study learning adjustment. I try to test whether the market 
evolves towards an equilibrium and, if so, how firms’ strategies tend to con- 
verge to any equilibrium strategy - joint monopoly equilibrium or oligopolistic 
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. I analyse the importance of the level of differenti­
ation between goods, the number of firms, number of periods and availability 
of information in determining market performance.
1.7 Experimental Results
Tables 1 to 5 (Appendix 2) present prices, demands and profits for each firm 
in each period in the five experiments.
Before examining convergence criteria as well as the existence of learning 
in this game, it is worth paying attention to some details observed during the 
experiments and that may have influenced the results. Apart from their own 
demand and profits, players were observed to use the table of prices fixed by 
the rest of the players in the past as one of the main sources of information 
before deciding on the strategy of the next period30. One consequence of 
such behaviour was that some players followed a tâtonnement process in their 
decision making31. Another consequence was that some players fixed exactly 
the same price as the one fixed by their rivals in the past. For example, in 
experiment 4, player 2 confessed to be following the signals of player 4 over 
all periods because she was convinced of the positive effect of those signals
30Thia behaviour reasonable since the prices are sometimes the only information available 
to firms on their rivals’ behaviour.
31However, this was not the general rule in any of the experiments.
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on her final ranking32.
A phenomenon that occurred especially in the first periods is that some 
players did not take into account that the time was passing and sometimes 
this resulted in prices below the marginal cost33 or even in negative prices34. 
None of them can be considered as firm decisions. However, the most striking 
example was observed in experiment 4 in which firm 3 charged a price of 
—3960 for period 14. This is treated as a profit reducing shock in the market. 
After the shock, no firm returned to the price fixed in period 14. Moreover, 
all firms, except for firm 4, reacted setting a higher price in period 15 than 
the price they had charged in period 14. Aware of their loss in the previous 
period, they wanted to compensate it by increasing profits more quickly. The 
interesting feature of this situation was that they had thought the same thing 
at the same time, which was the only way of having a positive result.
As far as strategic behaviour is concerned, in all experiments there were 
players that charged the same price over 2 or 3 periods as a mechanism of
93Players could not see each other’s profits, just prices. Therefore, players profits were 
not being ranked but she was concerned. Observe that this effect is also important in 
experiment 5 for firms 2 and 3 in periods 2-3, 7-8 and 10-11.
33As it happened in experiment 2 to firm 3 in period 3, and to firm 3 in period 1 in 
experiment 5. They charged prices of 5 and 0 respectively.
^In  experiment 5, firm 3 fixed a price of —1 in period 1. A way to avoid this kind of 
problems might be found in a message saying: ‘You have fixed a negative price. Please 
change your decision’ that could appear on the screen of the player that fixed a negative 
price. The problem is that players had two minutes and a half to make changes in their 
price, and only the price charged at the end of that time was considered a real decision 
of the player. At that time, any message would have interrupted the normal run and 
coordination between the rest of the players.
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studying the effects of other players’ strategies on their profits and demands. 
This is observed, for example, in experiment 1 for firms 2 and 5, in periods 1-3 
and 15-17 respectively, or in experiment 2 for firms 2, 3 and 5, in periods 17-19, 
13-15 and 17-19 respectively. In addition, in experiment 4 player 4 was trying 
to control the decisions of all other firms36. In particular, he was signalling 
to the others in order to make them believe that, for example, increases in 
his price were not followed by decreases in his profits and that his decision 
to increase price again in the next period was not punished with low profits. 
Player 4 said that he preferred to do this ‘signalling’ even if this could imply a 
sacrifice of a part of his profits. However, he said, ‘I took these decisions with 
a lot of care not to lose too much of my profits so that I could still be the ‘best’ 
at the end of the game’. He added that, even if he understood clearly the 
way of rewarding the participants in that experiment, he ‘had learned from 
other experiments that to be the best was always rewarded in one way or 
another’. In the early experimental literature, we find the idea that subjects’ 
experience from previous rounds or experiments affects the final outcome36. 
However, experience in experiments is obviously not the same as experience 
in the real life situation that an experiment is supposed to represent, and the 
behaviour of player 4 is a good evidence of that.
36When players came to receive their payment for their participation in the experiment, 
I asked them if they were following any specific strategy and, if so, what strategy and for 
what reasons.
36See Benson and Faminow [1988] and Keser [1990].
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1.7.1 Convergence
Figures 1-5 show prices set by the players along the twenty periods37 in the 
five experiments. Each figure includes a graph showing the evolution of prices 
over the last fifteen periods38.
In the figures, the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price is denoted by B  and 
the joint monopoly one is denoted by m. Firms tend to charge over time 
prices closer to the Bertrand-Nash solution than to the joint monopoly one. 
A process of convergence to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium can be observed38. 
In experiment 1, four firms charge, in the last period, prices below but close 
to the Nash equilibrium, while the other fixes a price above but closer to 
the Nash solution than to the joint monopoly one. This is shown in Fig­
ure 1. Plott’s [1982] result seems to be confirmed here: “When there is
imperfect information about actions or payoffs, prices converge to near the 
non-cooperative equilibrium
With the introduction of mode of reward B, players had an additional in­
centive to be the firm with the highest accumulative profits. Thus, one would 
expect more competition between firms and therefore a clearer tendency to 
the Bertrand-Nash solution. On the contrary, this new characteristic in the 
market resulted in a process that approaches - but does not converge - to 
the joint monopoly price on the part of all firms. In experiment 2, it is ob-
37Fifteen in the case of experiment 5.
3SThe figures that represent the corresponding evolution of profits for each experiment 
can be found in the appendix.
"Since the number of periods is limited to twenty, I can not refer to ‘convergence’ in a 
strict sense. I refer to a situation in which observations get closer to a limit point as time 
goes closer to the last period.
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served in Figure 2 that, from period 15 on, all firms charge prices above the 
Bertrand-Nash price. At the end, in period 20, three firms are above but 
closer to the Nash equilibrium price and two firms are closer to the joint 
monopoly equilibrium price. This may be due to imperfect information and 
the ‘naive’ belief that one can earn more by simply charging higher prices. 
Compare Figures 1 and 2. It is interesting to observe the effect that such 
naive beliefs have on the level of profits. Observe Figure 7 (Appendix 2). 
Profits are actually converging to the joint monopoly equilibrium. Even if 
prices are, in general, closer to the non-cooperative equilibrium price, firms 
end up earning profits that correspond to a collusive situation. The fact that 
one of the players - player 5 - sets very high prices over all periods results 
in making profits of all players increase. Therefore, the four firms earn the 
profits that they would earn under collusion by charging prices close to the 
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
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Experiment 1. Evolution of Price»
Figure 1.1: Prices. Experim ent 1
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Figure 1.2: Prices. Experim ent 2
Experiment Z Evolotion of Prices
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It has been said that many convergence results depend very much on 
whether players know the true model or not. In experiment 3, firms had 
perfect information about the true model and the values of the parameters. 
It makes sense to assume that agents did know how to compute the appro­
priate equilibrium and some of them actually did calculate the price that 
would maximise their profits taking their rivals’ actions as given. The result 
is that the process has a tendency towards the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium 
since period 10 and that, in fact, there is convergence to the Bertrand-Nash 
equilibrium price. See Figure 3.
However, no trace is found of the ‘tendency to higher than the one shot 
non-cooperative equilibrium prices’ mentioned by Plott [1982]. The evidence 
obtained from experiment 3 does not confirm Plott’s [1982] findings when he 
notes two of the prominent features of the experimental literature on oligopoly 
and price posting: “full information about payoffs, symmetric payoffs, full 
information about opponents ’s choices, and very long periods of interaction 
tend to facilitate collusive behaviour” and “higher than competitive prices are 
observed in oligopoly experiments” 40. An explanation of the disagreement be­
tween Plott’s results and the ones obtained here may be that 20 periods were 
not enough for collusive behaviour to be developed. However, note that prices 
were already converging to the non-cooperative equilibrium price since period 
14. This means that over the last six periods prices were moving around the 
non-cooperative solution and no tendency to go towards the collusive price 
was shown.
40Friedman and Hoggatt [1980] and Alger [1986] all provide evidence in this direction.
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Figure 1.3: Prices. Experim ent 3
Experiment 3. Evolution of Prices
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Another hypothesis that is tested is whether the process of convergence 
is different for different levels of competitive pressure in the market. The 
evidence from experiment 4 is that, as the value of 0 increases41 and, there­
fore, strategic complementarity becomes stronger - more aggresive strategies 
of a firm’s rivals result in a higher marginal profitability of the firm’s own 
strategies42 -, convergence to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is more likely. 
See Figure 4.
The mistake of firm 2 in period 14 to charge a negative price of —3960 
is treated as a profit-reducing exogenous shock. However, the trend of prices 
before this shock does not seem to change after that period. On the contrary, 
firms continue increasing prices with a tendency towards the Bertrand-Nash 
equilibrium. In period 20, firm 2 charges exactly the Bertrand-Nash price, 
firm 5 is below but close to it and the other three firms fix prices above but 
closer to the Nash than to the joint monopoly equilibrium price.
In general, prices are far from the joint monopoly equilibrium price and 
the increasing trend of prices is observed to disappear as prices get closer to 
the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
41 Remember that 6 =  0.4 in experiment 4 as compared to 0 =  0.14 in previous 
experiments.
4JThis A»finitir>n of strategic complementarity follows Bulow et al. [1985].
Figure 1.4: Prices. Experim ent 4
Experiment 4. Evolution of Prices
Inst 15 periods
36
At the beginning of each one of the experiments 1 to 4 players knew that 
they were going to play during 20 periods. This might have affected their 
behaviour. For example, a player might react less competitively to other 
players’ decisions if he/she knew that there were still many periods to go. In 
the last experiment, I did not inform players on the number of periods that 
they were going to play. The industry, for any reason, could ‘close’ at any 
moment. This ‘any moment’ resulted to be period 1543. Three firms were 
competing this time. Firm 2 ended with the Bertrand-Na&h equilibrium price 
while the other two were very close to the joint monopoly price. See Figure 5. 
With less firms competing in the market and, therefore, more possibilities for 
‘signaling’ and less competitive pressure, convergence to the joint monopoly 
equilibrium becomes more likely, even in the presence of uncertainty about 
the repetition of the game.
It seems that firms want to sacrifice a part of their profits in the present 
to signal their rivals that they do not intend to engage in competition and 
encourage them to set high prices and reach the joint maximisation point 
tacitly.
43There are two reasons why I chose period 15 to be the last period. One reason is that 
it bad to be a period different from period 20, to avoid any players’ expectations created 
by information from other players that played in the other experiments. The other reason 
is that, by observing players’ decisions along the experiment, I noticed that, from period 
12 on, players were already fixing prices around the non-cooperative equilibrium price.
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Figure 1.5: Prices. Experim ent 5
Experiment 5. Evolution of Price*
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Let us remember one of the main conclusions of Arthur [1990] which as­
serts that “the question of whether human behaviour adapts its way to an op­
timal steady-state44, or a Nash outcome admits no simple yes or no answer. 
The answer depends on the problem”. The obvious truth of this assertion 
seems to apply also here. As Arthur [1990] explains, how long it takes to 
uncover ‘reasonable’ or optimal choices depends upon the degree to which 
payoffs are tightly clustered45. There is what he calls ‘characteristic learning 
time ’ for human decisions in the economy that depends on the frequency of 
observed feedback on actions taken and on the payoff structure of the problem 
itself. The experimental data presented here can be considered as a confir­
mation of Arthur’s [1990] assertion. Since the economic environment of the 
decision problem remains constant, the learning time seems to be shorter than 
the problem horizon and convergence to equilibrium is expectable.
1.7.2 Learning Algorithms
The main question that I try to answer with this series of experiments is 
how firms proceed with their learning about the true model. One difficulty in 
learning about the structure of the model is that the observations which are 
used to learn from are themselves influenced by the actions of the players. 
The other difficulty is that there is a trade-off between gaining information 
about the model and short-run profit. Trying to maximise the sum of the flow 
of profits without knowing the complete specification of the model, players
44In the sense of concentrating on the best option.
45He developed a calibrated iterated-choice algorithm which showed that human learning 
ran lock in to an inferior choice, and that this is prone to happen where payoffs to choices 
are closely clustered, random and, therefore, difficult to discriminate among.
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face a quite complicated problem.
The model includes three parameters - a, and 6 - that are unknown 
to the firms. The role of maximisation of profits just for one period is not 
negligible. One way to act in the short run could consist of fixing prices which 
give a low immediate profit but which, in the long run, give more information 
about the structure of the model.
It is remarkable that players did not simply use a tatonnement method. 
Out of few exceptions, players kept on an specific behaviour that is described 
below46.
I already mentioned Hopkins’ [1992] algorithm concerning the mimicry of 
the human behaviour observed in a series of experiments47. In particular, the 
participants in his experiments changed prices in what Hopkins believes is 
the ‘right direction’ by an arbitrary amount:
Pit =  f t i - i  + < • < « %•  sign *»«-1 — * i t - 2.P i t -1 — P it—2 . + 6* (1.7)
where tt is distributed as a 7V(0,1) and u* is a random variable distributed 
uniformly on (0,20). That is, “if a price cut (hike) raised profits the previous 
period, another price cut (hike) (of size [i- " - a* + et]) follows”.
That algorithm is observed to be followed by some of the agents of the 
experiments presented here. In some cases, I find that some of the participants
46In those few cases, however, series of prices resulted in white noise models which are 
stationary stochastic processes (pst =  6 + en, where 6 is the average of the process and 
Ut  — N ( 0 , 1)).
47Hopkins [1992] works with data obtained from Chautard and Raby’s [1991] 
experiments.
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in specific experiments fit perfectly Hopkins’ algorithm. This happens in 
situations in which strategies do converge to an equilibrium price48.
Nevertheless, agents more often fit just one side of the algorithm in the 
sense that a price hike that raised profits the previous period is followed 
by another price hike in the next period49. And this is especially true in 
experiment 4. I think that one explanation to this result is that, in experiment
4, the equilibrium price is far from the unit cost and, given that players are 
generally hesitant to charge ‘high prices’, they face situations in which a 
price decrease results in a profit increase less often than situations in which 
the opposite happens.
When players ‘try’ strategies that lie far from any of the two equilibria, 
either the Bertrand-Nash or the joint monopoly50, their behaviour seems to 
be described by algorithms different from the one presented in Hopkins [1992]. 
The data reveal a kind of behaviour that can be generalized with: “if a price 
hike (cut) raised (decreased) profits the previous period, a price hike (cut), of 
an arbitrary amount, follows”. Such a behaviour can be described with the 
following algorithm:
Pit =  P i t - i  + • s*0n[jTrt_i -  ir*_2] + c, (1.8)
where et is distributed as a N (0,1) and <4 is a random variable distributed 
uniformly on (0,45). This is an algorithm that could seem unstable since the
^Experiments 2 and 5 define situations that converge towards the joint monopoly equi­
librium price. Also, experiments 3 and 4 are characterised by clear convergence to the 
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price.
49But which does not apply for a price cut.
60This is the case of experiment 1.
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direction of changes in pnces as well as their magnitude depend on the sign 
of previous profit changes. However, the results of the experiments show that 
prices always remain very close to both equilibria of the one-shot game51.
To make a brief parenthesis, I considered the possibility that some players 
conditioned their decisions not only on their profits in past periods, but also 
on demand changes. Price decisions, however, do not seem to be conditioned 
on the trajectory of the demand. Nevertheless, I observed that some players 
reacted to a decrease (increase) in demand by decreasing (increasing) their 
price in the next period. When this happens, players react to decreases in 
demand by fixing a lower price in next period even if the profit had increased 
in the previous period. This, of course, cannot be considered as a general 
rule.
Rather than a tâtonnement process, I have observed that the choice of 
strategic variables at each period and the resulting profits allow agents to 
learn about the structure of the model and the strategies adopted by their 
adversaries. The existence of convergence to an equilibrium corroborates this 
conjecture.
Consider the calibrated iterated-choice algorithm developed by Arthur 
[1990] on human learning. At each time t, the agent associates a vector of 
strengths with the N  possible actions to undertake. The strength vector
61A general analysis of the series of prices as times-series data indicated that, except 
for the white noise series mentioned, all series are stationary processes generated by either 
autoregressive models j4ü(1) (i.e.pa — ¿+$ft,t-i+£i<) or by autoregressive-moving average 
processes A R M A (1,1) (i.e. =  6 +  ♦ft.i-i — + «<«)• Two tests were applied to
fit a generator model of each series, the ¿-statistic of significance and the Akaike’s [1973] 
fit measure (AIC) that determines the appropriate lag length and which rewards good fit 
but penalises the loss of degrees of freedom. See Greene [1993] for details.
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summarises the current confidence the agent has learned to associate with 
actions. The agent chooses his/her action with probabilities proportional to 
his/her current confidence in the N  actions and learning takes place as these 
probabilities of actions are updated. Players in the experiments may have 
been thinking a similar way. Players may have been fixing specific intervals, 
setting their prices within those intervals with a specific probability. These 
intervals of prices as well as the probabilities could have been changing as 
time went on, making of this a way of learning.
1.7.3 Least Squares Learning Process
It is worth discussing the ordinary least squares process as a possible learning 
rule for the mis-spedfied model. Remember that the estimation of the de­
mand function by ordinary least squares (OLS) was part of the information 
set of players in this series of experiments. The reason for including that as 
part of the information to be consulted has to be found in the importance 
that the OLS method has been given by the literature on learning.
Authors like Bray [1982] and Marcet and Sargent [1989] establish that 
convergence to rational expectations will occur with a ‘reasonable’ learning 
process such as ordinary least squares learning53. Working with least squares 
estimation, Kirman [1975, 1983] shows that a ‘reasonable’ learning process
62Marcet and Sargent work with an adaptive model in which functions change over time 
in a way designed to make them more consistent with the unknown laws of motion govern­
ing the environment. However, agents operate under the continually falsified assumption 
that the law of motion is time invariant and known for sure. The learning algorithm is 
represented recursively, in the form of a stochastic difference equation and the only possible 
limit points of that equation for the perceived law of motion are the rational expectations 
equilibria.
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could make the sequence of prices converge to the Cournot-Nash solution, 
provided that the estimate of the slope demand equals the true slope of the 
demand53. By simulations, he arrives at the conclusion that,
it becomes clew that the process does indeed converge given an arbitrary 
set of starting conditions. However, the problem of establishing convergence 
analytically remains unresolved. Evidently, there are special cases that can 
be disposed of quickly. Consider the case where there are two firms playing 
two periods. If each period both players fix the same price with respect to 
each other, the process converges to the collusive solution and firms act as a 
joint monopoly.”
More recently, Brous9eau and Kirman [1991] outlined the importance of 
testing whether agents use the least-squares method in order to get additional 
information about the market. The theoretical conclusion of Brousseau and 
Kirman [1991] is that least squares is not stable. They show that, in general, 
firms do not converge to the Nash equilibrium prices. Moreover, firms will not 
receive any indication that their initial model is mis-specified. With OLS, as 
the number of observations increases, each new observation has a decreasing 
effect on parameter estimates. Therefore, the trajectory of prices depends on 
initial conditions and slows as time passes. The conclusions of Brousseau and 
Kirman [1991] are confirmed by Hopkins’ [1992] simulations.
The prices suggested by the OLS estimation of firm i’s demand on its own 
price, are expressed by:
a, (1.9)Pi = 26, 2
53Kirman works with a symmetric quantity-setting duopoly model in which the firms 
are unaware that their demands depend on each other’s actions.
where a, and ¿f SLre the estimates of the parameters of the following re­
gression:
$ = a, -  biPi (1.10)
Firstly and, in contrast with Chautaxd and Raby’s [1991] experiments, 
players did not refuse to use the OLS method. Some of them applied the 
ordinary least squares method to estimate the demand function54. For ex­
ample, player 2 in experiment 5 used OLS option most of the periods55 and 
it is precisely this player who charges the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price 
(112) in the last period. This player was observed to use the OLS option after 
period 5. This may explain that, after period 7, player 2 charged prices that 
are not far from what would be the best response if the model estimated by 
the OLS were the true model. This observation contradicts Brousseau and 
Kirman [1991]. However, my conclusion is that this can not be considered 
as resulting from the use by players of the OLS estimated model as the true 
one56. I analysed the evolution of the OLS estimates period by period. Every 
new observation adds no information to the estimated parameters of the de­
mand function. In this Bense, changes in the prices charged each period are 
not translated in changes in the prices suggested by the OLS estimation of 
the demand function.
64 At the end of each one of the experiments, 1 collected the sheets of paper which I gave 
the players in the beginning of each experiment.
65At the end of the experiment, she said that she chose prices using the OLS’s option of 
the menu.
58In fact, player 2 should have set prices around 114.
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Most of the players were observing the OLS-help on the main menu but, 
looking at the past, they could realise that the actions taken by the other 
firms were affecting their own profits and that this effect was not captured by 
the simple model of the demand function estimated by OLS. These players 
indicated that they gave up using OLS before making their decisions.
As a result, players were just observers of the OLS help-fadlity and I am 
sure that this method helped them to learn how the demand function did not 
look like. The results concerning convergence have no direct relation with the 
OLS learning rule. In these experiments, the mis-specified part of the model 
seems to be too important and, therefore, a simple regression would never 
blind the firms.
Table C contains the OLS estimations obtained over all periods along the 
five experiments for each firm:
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Ta ble  C
OLS Estimates
Param eter Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 Firm 5
¿ it 524 532.6 529 572 526
bu 2.6 2.7 2.7 3 2.6
Experiment 1 S.d.(au ) 5.35 2.23 5.6 9.3 2.56
S.d.(bn) 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.12 0.03
R\ 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.99
a&- 530 551 458 524 534
6a,- 2.66 2.88 1.89 2.66 2.77
Experiment 2 S.d.(av ) 6.23 14.9 43.7 8.97 11.3
S.d.(h>) 0.03 0.14 0.17 0.06 0.08
% 0.99 0.95 0.86 0.98 0.98
¿3» 541 492 547 558 550
¿3. 2.79 2.39 2.8 2.9 2.85
Experiment 3 s.d.fa) 4.56 6.9 3.32 5.4 5
S.d.{bx) 0.1 0.07 0.05 0.16 0.12
0.97 0.98 0.99 0.94 0.96
¿4« 584.6 694 661.9 650 649.9
¿4< 2.17 3 2.78 2.78 2.65
Experiment 4 S.d.( d4<) 73.38 34 68 62 78.3
S .<f.(64, ) 1.13 0 0.55 0.57 0.7
....... .. 0.16 0.99 0.57 0.57 0.44
¿5» 509.9 521.7 523.6 - -
¿8. 2.6 2.77 2.7 - -
Experiment 5 S .d . ( 0 « ) 13.19 5.9 7.78 -
S .d . ( iK ) 0.18 0.04 0.06 - -
Kl 0.93 0.99 0.99 - -
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1.8 Conclusions
I have applied experimental methods to test learning behaviour in a market 
which is repeated a finite number of periods and in which firms have im­
perfect information about the specification of the demand. Firms produce a 
differentiated product, an aspect that has not yet been studied in an experi- 
mental setting. Without particularly restrictive assumptions, I have observed 
convergence around the Bertrand-Nash and the joint monopoly equilibrium 
prices. Nevertheless, the non-cooperative solution seems to attract players' 
strategies in the long-run.
In fact, when firms have imperfect information about demand and, there­
fore, about payoffs, prices are more likely to converge to the Bertrand-Nash 
equilibrium than to the joint monopoly equilibrium.
Quasi-convergence to the non-cooperative solution was observed when the 
objective was to maximise total accumulated profits. Nevertheless, an addi­
tional incentive to be among the ‘best’ firms in the industry does not seem to 
result in convergence to either of the two equilibria. A strong tendency to con­
verge to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium was observed in a model with higher 
strategic complementarity. Therefore, the degree of product differentiation 
plays an important role in determining the process of convergence.
On the contrary, but also under imperfect information about the structure 
of demand, convergence to the collusive solution is more likely to be observed 
when the number of firms decreases.
If there is perfect information about the true model, prices clearly converge 
to the one shot non-cooperative solution. Thus, and contrary to the results 
asserted by the literature on experiments in oligopoly, no evidence has been 
found for any collusive behaviour when firms have symmetric payoffs and
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full information about payoffs and about opponents’ choices. Not only is 
convergence to the non-cooperative prices observed, but prices start moving 
clearly towards the direction of the non-cooperative equilibrium half the way 
through the time horizon.
The results of the experiments presented here show that, in general, agents 
use simple mechanical rules to decide their strategies. They choose their 
strategies realising that their performance in the past has depended on their 
rivals’ actions. The algorithm that can be used to simulate agents’ responses 
does not explidtely involve any optimisation. The algorithm does not differ 
much from other human learning rules already analysed in the literature57.
Although agents in the experiments do not seem to rely too much on 
statistics based on past actions, the ordinary least squares method appears 
to be a good reference for agents’ dedsion making. In general, if players had 
taken the OLS estimated demand function as the true model when setting 
prices, the result advanced already by Brousseau and Kirman [1991] of not 
convergence to the Nash equilibrium price would not have been confirmed. 
All prices suggested by the OLS estimated demand, from the seventh period 
on, are dose to the Bertrand-Nash solution. As a consequence, the ‘human’ 
algorithm actually used by agents, resulted in prices from the OLS estimated 
model converging to the non-cooperative equilibrium price.
S7A11 based on the Holland’s ci al. [1987] ‘classifier system’ in which classifiers are 
concatenated into an interdependent network, with actions taken serving as conditions for 
triggering choice among further, dependent actions. Note: a classifier is a condition/action 
couple where the action is allowed to be activated only if the condition is fulfilled.
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1.9 Appendix: Instructions and Data Tables
1.9.1 Instructions
The intructions available to players at the beginning of each experiment are 
presented next. Note that bold characters are used to emphasize those points 
that are specific to one experiment or a subset of experiments, but not com­
mon in all of them.
Experim ent 1
This is an experiment about decision making in an industry. The instructions 
are simple. Follow them carefully. The quantity of money that you will receive 
is going to depend on your decisions and on the decisions of the other players. 
You will receive a quantity of money in cash at the end of the experiment.
You are going to take part in the experiment that will start in the next 
few minutes. To be able to play, you have to use the following information:
1. There are five firms in the industry. You are one of them.
2. The unit cost of production is constant and equal to 40 monetary units.
3 . You produce a product that is one of the differentiated varieties pro­
duced in this industry. All firms produce at the same unit cost.
4 . Your decision variable is price. Each period you have to decide the price 
of your product and wait for the demand that corresponds to that specific 
price and the prices set by the rest of the players.
5. Each period has a duration of exactly 2.5 minutes. Therefore, you have 
two and a half minutes to decide the price for the next period.
6 . The industry lives a total of 20 periods.
7. If you do not fix any price, the price by default will be the price you
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fixed the previous period.
8 . At the end of each period, you will know through the screen the demand 
and the profit that correspond to the price fixed for that period.
9. If you fix a price that corresponds to a negative demand you will obtain 
a zero demand and profit respectively.
10. There are some additional help-fadlities:
- graphics showing the evolution over time of profit-price and price-demand.
- the prices fixed by the other firms in the past.
- least squares estimation of the demand function based on your past 
observations.
11. The reward you will receive for your participation in this 
experiment consists of a quantity equal to  your to tal profits over 
the 20 periods multiplied try an equivalence factor of 0.01 pesetas. 
Therefore, the more profits you make the more money you will 
earn.
Thank you for your collaboration. Are you ready?.
Note: Any comment will be welcome. Aurora García
Experim ent 2
This is an experiment about decision making in an industry. The instructions 
are simple. Follow them carefully. The quantity of money that you will receive 
is going to depend on your decisions and on the decisions of the other players. 
You will receive a quantity of money in cash at the end of the experiment.
You are going to take part in the experiment that will start in the next 
few minutes. To be able to play, you have to use the following information:
1. There are five firms in the industry. You are one of them.
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2. The unit cost of production is constant and equal to 40 monetary units.
3. You produce a product that is one of the differentiated varieties pro­
duced in this industry. All firms produce at the same unit cost.
4. Your decision variable is price. Each period you have to decide the price 
of your product and wait for the demand that corresponds to that specific 
price and the prices set by the rest of the players.
5. Each period has a duration of exactly 2.5 minutes. Therefore, you have 
two and a half minutes to decide the price for the next period.
6 . The industry lives a total of 20 periods.
7. If you do not fix any price, the price by default will be the price you 
fixed the previous period.
8. At the end of each period, you will know through the screen the demand 
and the profit that correspond to the price fixed for that period.
0. If you fix a price that corresponds to a negative demand you will obtain 
a zero demand and profit respectively.
10. There are some additional help-fadlities:
- graphics showing the evolution over time of profit-price and price-demand.
• the prices fixed by the other firms in the past.
- least squares estimation of the demand function based on your past 
observations.
11. The reward you will receive for your participation in this 
experim ent consists of a fixed quantity of 1000 pesetas plus an 
additional quantity equal to  your to ta l profits over the  20 periods, 
multiplied by an equivalence factor of 0.006 pesetas. Additionaly, a 
quantity of 1000 pesetas will be d istributed , proportionally to  th e ir 
to ta l profits, between the  two players th a t will have the  highest
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accumulative profits in the 20 periods.
Thank you for your collaboration. Are you ready?.
Note: Any comment will be welcome. Aurora García.
Experiment 3
This is an experiment about decision making in an industry. The instructions 
are simple. Follow them carefully. The quantity of money that you will receive 
is going to depend on your decisions and on the decisions of the other players. 
You will receive a quantity of money in cash at the end of the experiment.
You are going to take part in the experiment that will start in the next 
few minutes. To be able to play, you have to use the following information:
1. There are five firms in the industry. You are one of them.
2. The unit cost of production is constant and equal to 40 monetary units.
3 . You produce a product that is one of the differentiated varieties pro­
duced in this industry. All firms produce at the same unit cost.
4. Your decision variable is price. Each period you have to decide the price 
of your product and wait for the demand that corresponds to that specific 
price and the prices set by the rest of the players.
5. Imagine th a t you are firm i and j  denotes any one of the  other 
firms. The mechanism th a t determines your demand in the  m arket 
is given by the  following function:
qi = o  -P p i + d ^ p j  
j#
where a = 500, fi — 3, & = 0.14.
6 . Each period has a duration of exactly 2.5 minutes. Therefore, you have 
two and a half minutes to decide the price for the next period.
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7. The industry lives a total of 20 periods.
8 . If you do not fix any price, the price by default will be the price you 
fixed the previous period.
9. At the end of each period, you will know through the screen the demand 
and the profit that correspond to the price fixed for that period.
10. If you fix a price that corresponds to a negative demand you will 
obtain a zero demand and profit respectively.
11. There are some additional help-fadlities:
- graphics showing the evolution over time of profit-price and price-demand.
- the prices fixed by the other firms in the past.
- least squares estimation of the demand function based on your past 
observations.
12. The reward you will receive for your participation in this 
experim ent consists of a quantity equal to  your to ta l profits over 
th e  20 periods multiplied by an equivalence factor of 0.01 pesetas. 
Therefore, th e  more profits you make the  more money you will 
earn.
Thank you for your collaboration. Are you ready?.
Note: Any comment will be welcome. Aurora Garcia.
Experim ent 4
See instructions for experiment 1. The difference between experiments 1 and 
4 is that the value of parameter 6 is different. However, this does not result 
in changes in the instructions.
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This is an experiment about decision making in an industry. The instructions 
are simple. Follow them carefully. The quantity of money that you will receive 
is going to depend on your decisions and on the decisions of the other players. 
You will receive a quantity of money in cash at the end of the experiment.
You are going to take part in the experiment that will start in the next 
few minutes. To be able to play, you have to use the following information:
1. There are three firms in the industry. You are one of them.
2. The unit cost of production is constant and equal to 40 monetary units.
3. You produce a product that is one of the differentiated varieties pro­
duced in this industry. All firms produce at the same unit cost.
4. Your decision variable is price. Each period you have to decide the price 
of your product and wait for the demand that corresponds to that specific 
price and the prices set by the rest of the players.
5. Each period has a duration of exactly 2.5 minutes. Therefore, you have 
two and a half minutes to decide the price for the next period.
6. If you do not fix any price, the price by default will be the price you 
fixed the previous period.
7. At the end of each period, you will know through the screen the demand 
and the profit that correspond to the price fixed for that period.
8. If you fix a price that corresponds to a negative demand you will obtain 
a zero demand and profit respectively.
0. There are some additional help-fadlities:
- graphics showing the evolution over time of profit-price and price-demand.
- the prices fixed by the other firms in the past.
- least squares estimation of the demand function based on your past
Experiment 5
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observations.
10. The reward you will receive for your participation in this 
experiment consists of a quantity equal to your total profits over all 
periods multiplied by an equivalence factor of 0.01 pesetas. There­
fore, the more profits you make the more money you will earn.
Thank you for your collaboration. Are you ready?.
Note: Any comment will be welcome. Aurora García
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1.9.2 Data and Result Plots
Experiment 1
Data
T able  1
E X P E R I M E N T 1
P e rio d F ir m 1 F ir m 2 F ir m  8 F ir m  4 F ir m  6
Pi «1 n x Pa 93 n 3 Pa «9 n s P4 «4 H 4 Pft «ft n *
1 eo 366 7320 50 397 3970 55 361 5716 150 63 9130 70 334 10020
2 so 310 12400 60 373 7460 66 346 9744 160 59 7060 70 342 10260
3 105 229 14665 75 323 11305 96 251 14556 70 339 10170 70 339 10170
4 90 263 14150 65 299 13455 115 205 15375 100 252 15120 60 315 12600
5 100 260 15600 110 226 15960 117 206 15662 110 226 15960 90 291 14550
e 9 7 273 15561 115 217 16275 115 217 16275 120 201 16060 110 233 16310
r 99 270 15930 125 169 16065 110 236 16520 130 173 15570 116 220 16600
• 99 270 15930 120 20ft 16400 116 211 16456 124 192 16126 120 205 16400
9 119 210 16590 122 201 16462 115 223 16725 126 169 16254 119 210 16690
10 120 206 16640 125 193 16405 115 224 16600 126 163 16104 120 206 16640
i l 115 223 16725 120 207 16560 117 217 16709 127 165 16096 121 204 16524
12 117 217 16709 122 201 16462 116 213 16614 126 166 16166 117 2 1 7 16709
13 l ie 219 16644 120 206 16460 111 234 16614 127 164 16006 116 212 16536
14 110 23ft 16450 117 213 16401 115 220 16500 125 166 15960 110 235 16450
16 lift 220 16500 lift 220 16500 113 226 16496 126 166 16910 110 236 16620
16 115 220 16500 115 220 16500 107 245 16415 126 179 15752 113 226 16496
17 109 236 16422 115 219 16425 109 236 16422 123 194 16102 115 219 16425
1« 116 214 16264 113 224 16352 111 230 16330 115 2 17 16275 105 349 16165
19 115 217 16275 115 217 16275 107 242 16214 10ft 246 16120 114 220 16260
20 110 232 16240 110 232 16240 109 236 16264 110 232 16240 117 210 16170
n ‘ 30973ft 297992 306632 296246
3 0 4 33 7
Evolution of Profits in a Plot
In the graph that corresponds to Figure 6, m denotes the joint monopoly 
equilibrium profit and B  denotes the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium one.
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pro
fits
xlO4 Experiment 1. Evolution of profits
Figure 1.6: Profits. Experim ent 1
lu t 15 periods
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Experiment 2
D ata
Table 2
E X P E R I M E N T  3
P e r io d F ir m 1 F ir m 3 F ir m  8 F ir m  4 F ir m  6
P i 91 n» Pa 93 n a P3 99 n 3 P4 94 n « PS 96 n .
1 60 388 3880 60 357 7140 100 331 13860 56 3 69 5904 65 3 73 5580
3 70 353 10560 49 418 3763 300 0 0 47 434 3968 46 4 30 3150
3 0 536 -31440 80 385 11400 6 630 •16300 70 316 9460 100 333 13330
4 80 300 13000 135 158 13430 0 551 •33040 84 3 87 13638 75 315 11035
6 86 313 14040 160 77 9340 80 338 13130 130 303 16160 130 303 16160
e 135 303 17170 95 396 16380 109 352 17388 195 0 0 150 133 13530
7 300 0 0 100 381 16860 107 359 17353 134 174 16356 136 171 16345
8 135 167 15865 105 361 16965 104 364 16896 130 183 16470 174 44 5896
9 115 335 16875 116 335 16875 109 344 16836 130 178 16030 145 131 13755
10 109 340 16560 110 337 16590 109 340 16560 133 196 16368 137 153 14744
11 109 335 16315 90 396 14750 100 364 15840 115 3 1 7 16375 141 136 13635
13 100 370 16300 110 339 16730 130 176 15840 133 301 16483 139 148 14663
13 130 311 16880 110 343 16940 133 301 16683 134 167 15698 138 154 15093
14 115 333 16650 115 333 16650 133 197 16351 134 194 16396 130 307 16560
16 113 331 16633 111 334 16614 133 196 16368 133 199 16318 119 309 16511
ie 116 333 16735 130 307 16560 131 304 16634 133 198 16434 133 198 16434
17 130 306 16480 115 333 16650 130 306 16480 119 310 16590 130 306 16480
18 119 309 16511 115 333 16650 130 306 16480 118 313 16536 130 306 16460
19 118 313 16536 115 331 16576 119 309 16611 117 315 16565 130 306 16460
30 117 316 16633 117 316 16633 119 310 16590 117 316 16633 135 191 16335
T y s r 350971 393393 335340 3 76070 3 70964
Evolution of Profits in a Plot
See next page.
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fita
Figure 1.7: Profits. Experim ent 2
zlO4 Experìmeat Z Evofotioo of profin
last 15 perìodi
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Experim ent 3
D ata
Table 3
E X P E R I M E N T  8
P e r io d F ir m 1 F ir m 2 F ir m  ft F ir m  4 F ir m 8
p i 9i H i Pa 9a n a P3 93 n a P« 94 n 4 P® 9fi n »
1 i s o 110 12100 150 110 12100 100 267 16020 90 299 14950 90 299 14950
2 135 173 16435 210 0 0 125 204 17340 110 251 17570 110 251 17570
3 135 175 16635 130 191 17190 175 49 6615 125 206 17510 140 169 15900
4 133 169 15717 130 178 16020 130 176 16020 100 273 16360 125 194 16490
6 130 180 16200 130 180 16200 128 187 16456 120 212 16960 125 196 16660
6 130 177 15930 132 171 15732 120 208 16640 106 255 16575 120 208 16640
7 126 193 16405 125 193 16405 124 196 16464 120 209 16720 117 216 16766
• 123 199 16517 126 193 16406 125 193 16405 120 208 16640 115 224 16800
9 120 204 16320 120 204 16320 120 204 16320 106 248 16368 113 226 16498
10 115 2 17 16275 117 210 16170 100 264 15840 110 232 16240 114 220 16280
11 118 210 16360 116 217 16492 115 220 16500 110 235 16450 118 210 16360
12 117 214 16478 117 214 16478 115 220 16500 112 230 16560 120 205 16400
13 117 214 16478 116 217 16492 116 221 16575 113 2 27 16671 122 199 16318
14 116 217 16492 116 217 16492 118 211 16458 115 220 16500 116 217 16492
IS 116 216 16416 116 216 16416 116 216 16416 113 226 16498 115 220 16500
i e 116 219 16425 114 222 16428 114 222 16428 113 225 16425 113 219 16425
IT 113 225 16425 111 231 16401 115 218 16350 113 225 16425 116 215 16340
IS 114 222 1642S 112 228 16416 115 218 16350 112 228 16416 116 216 16350
19 116 216 16416 114 222 16428 114 222 1642S 112 228 16416 114 222 16426
20 114 222 16428 114 222 16428 114 222 16428 113 225 16425 113 225 16426
n , 322890 307013 318553 330599 326632
Evolution of Profits in a Plot 
See next page.
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xlO4 Experiment ì  Evoimtioa of profili
Figure 1.8: Profits. Experim ent 3
la* 15 periodi
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Experiment 4
D ata
Table 4
E X P E R I M E N T  4
P e r io d F ir m 1 F ir m 2 F ir m  8 F ir m  4 F ir m  6
p i i i n i P3 93 n a P3 43 n 3 P4 94 n 4 Pa 9fi n «
1 99 374 22066 175 116 15660 45 558 2790 150 201 22110 58 514 9252
2 97 381 21717 175 116 15660 70 473 14190 120 303 2 4240 65 490 12250
3 109 385 25165 100 395 23700 105 376 24570 200 55 8800 74 464 16456
4 119 2 97 23463 100 362 21720 110 328 22960 60 430 17200 96 376 21056
5 108 346 23528 115 322 24150 107 349 23383 105 356 2 3140 96 360 22040
6 113 335 24455 117 321 24717 105 362 2 3530 110 345 2 41 60 103 369 2 32 47
7 114 340 25160 116 333 25308 108 360 24480 120 320 26600 111 350 2 4650
8 117 337 25949 116 334 26052 114 348 25752 125 310 26350 114 348 2 5752
9 119 340 26860 120 336 26880 120 336 26880 135 265 27075 117 347 26719
10 119 346 27334 125 325 27625 125 325 27625 138 281 27538 119 346 27334
11 123 343 28469 140 286 28600 130 320 28600 141 282 28482 120 354 26320
12 127 336 29232 130 326 29340 138 299 29302 150 258 28380 125 343 29155
13 129 335 29815 127 342 29754 150 264 29040 150 264 29040 129 335 29616
14 133 0 0 <3960 12603 •50412000 140 0 0 159 0 0 126 0 0
16 138 312 30576 130 340 30600 142 299 30496 165 256 29325 139 309 30691
ie 138 318 31164 140 311 31100 149 281 30629 150 277 3 0470 141 308 31108
17 139 3 17 31383 148 287 30996 147 290 31030 153 270 30610 138 321 31458
1« 144 302 31408 142 308 31416 148 268 31104 152 274 30688 142 308 31416
10 142 306 31212 140 313 31300 149 283 30847 150 279 30690 142 306 31212
20 147 287 30709 140 311 31100 146 291 30846 150 2 77 3 0470 136 328 31160
V ' 4™ n « 519685 •49906322 486266 494256 463191
Evolution of Profits in a Plot
See next page.
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xlO4 Experiment 4. Evolution of profits
Figure 1.9: Profits. Experim ent 4
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Experiment 5
D ata
Table 5
EX1P E R I M E N T  8
P e r io d F ir m 1 F ir m 2 F ir m  8
P i H i Pa *a n 3 P3 «3 Ha
1 79 263 10257 0 516 •20720 -1 521 •21361
2 99 246 14514 100 243 14580 85 291 13095
3 145 119 12496 130 167 15030 100 264 15840
4 124 189 15676 170 40 6200 92 293 15236
6 124 186 15624 130 167 15030 120 199 15920
6 114 219 16206 135 151 14345 125 183 16556
T 99 260 15340 130 160 14400 115 208 16600
8 69 342 9918 115 193 14475 95 268 14190
9 114 206 15244 119 169 14931 85 299 13455
10 104 235 15040 110 216 15120 92 274 14246
11 94 271 14634 116 203 15225 110 219 15330
12 88 289 13872 120 185 14800 105 234 15210
13 108 229 16572 110 222 16540 115 206 15450
14 108 230 15640 110 223 15610 120 191 15260
16 119 196 16484 112 219 15768 116 206 15656
215716 179334 188704
Evolution of Profits in a Plot 
See next page.
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xlO4 Experiment 5. Evoiatian of profits
Figure 1.10: Profits. Experim ent 5
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Part II
Dominance in the Tetra Pale 
Case: An Empirical Approach
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II. 1 Introduction
One of the recent cases in European Community competition law concerns 
Tetra Pak, one of the world leaders in the field of cartons for liquid food and 
the equipment and technology for filling these cartons. Economic analysis has 
been applied to defend both the Tetra Pak and the EC Commission positions. 
Most of the work produced on both sides is theoretical. I undertake here an 
empirical approach to the Tetra Pak case.
The decision of the Commission was based on information that seems to 
prove Tetra Pak’s anti-competitive behaviour. This paper aims at testing 
this result using the same information as the EC Commission. In particular, 
I test the hypotheses that Tetra Pak has a dominant position in the non­
aseptic sector and that this position is due to Tetra Pak’s abusive practices 
with respect to its monopoly in the aseptic sector.
Section 2 is a brief introduction to the Tetra Pak case. Section 3 makes a 
detailed description of the carton industry as a whole. In section 4 ,1 attempt 
an analysis of the concept of ‘dominance’ from an economic and from a legal 
point of view. Section 5 discusses the arguments that have been used to defend 
the two different positions, the one of the EC Commission as the accuser and 
that of Tetra Pak as the accused, in the light of the legal and/or economic 
literature on dominance. Section 6 contains the empirical analysis of the case 
and the main results. Finally, in section 7 I discuss the main conclusions.
II.2 The Tetra Pak Case
The Tetra Pak group makes cartons for packing both fresh - or non-aseptic - 
and aseptic liquids. It has also its own technology for the manufacturing of
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machines for both fresh and aseptic liquids. In the sector of aseptics, Tetra 
has only one competitor, PKL, which uses a different technology58.
Tetra has one main competitor in the production of cartons for non­
aseptics liquids: Elopak. Elopak brought the case to the EC Commission. 
More specifically, Elopak accused Tetra Pak for having infringed articles 85 
and 86 of the EC Treaty59.
The Tetra Pak case has gone through two stages. In the first stage, “Tetra 
Pak I” [1988], the Commission found that Tetra Pak had infringed article 86 
by preventing potential competitors from having access to a novel technique 
of filling cartons under aseptic conditions60. In 1981 the British National 
Research and Development Council (NRDC) assigned an exclusive license for 
the use of this technique to Novus Corp, a member of the Liquipak group61. 
In 1986 Tetra got hold of the exclusive license assigned to Liquipak62.
Tetra’s exclusive license benefited from the block exemption provided for 
in the Commission’s regulation concerning patent licensing agreements. How­
ever, the Commission referred to the fact that this benefit can be withdrawn
^ T h e  aseptic packaging Tetra Brik is exclusively produced by T etra Pak.
59See EC Commission Decision [1988], ‘T etra Pak I ’ L 272/27, and [1991] T e tra  Pak II’, 
L 72/1.
60This technique concerns the UHT treated or fully sterilized milk.
61The Liquipak group specialises in the development and manufacturing of filling equip­
ment for liquid food products. In 1986 Tetra acquired Liquipak International Inc. (St. 
Paul, Minnesota, USA), Liquipak International BV  (Netherlands) and Pak Center Limited 
(UK). T etra did not acquire Novus Corp which in 1983, however, had assigned its licence 
to the companies th a t Tetra subsequently acquired.
62The British Technology Group (BTG), a public undertaking which had meanwhile
taken over NRDC’s activities, did not raise objections to th a t acquisition.
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when the licensed products are not exposed to effective competition. As a 
result, Tetra agreed to abandon exclusivity and BTG undertook to start ne­
gotiations with both Tetra and Elopak to grant non-exclusive licenses63.
In the second stage of the case, Elopak Italia (Milan) asked the Com­
mission to investigate whether or not Tetra Pak Italia64 and its associated 
companies were infringing article 86 of the Treaty65. In its Decision “Tetra 
Pak II ” [1991], the EC Commission charged Tetra Pak with having taken ad­
vantage of its dominant position in the aseptic sector in machines and cartons 
to commit abuses in the related sector of non-aseptics. Tetra Pak’s alleged 
abuse includes the use of restrictive contracts, discriminatory and predatory 
pricing of its cartons and liquid packaging machinery, and even an exclusive 
contract preventing competitors from advertising in an Italian milk trade 
journal.
In July 1991, the European Commission fined the company a record Ecu 
75 million for abusing its dominant market position in Western Europe, claim­
ing that Tetra Pak had pursued a deliberate policy aiming to eliminate actual 
or potential competitors. Tetra Pak has appealed to the European Court 
against the fine. The case is still under investigation.
MSee Gyselen [1990] for a more detailed discussion.
MW ith headquarters in Modena.
65In principle, Italy was the only country affected by the denounce from the beginning. 
However, the EC Commission considers the EEC as the geographic market and, there­
fore, the decision was extended to all Member States. See Weiss [1972], Elzinga et al. 
[1973][1978], Shrieves [1978], Uri ti  al. [1985] and Scheffman [1985] for discussion on the 
‘correct’ definition of geographic markets.
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II.3 Analysis of the Industry
This section is a summary of the history of the firms involved in the case as 
well as a description of the products, the technology, the demand and the 
distribution sides of the market.
II.3.1 The History of the Firms 
T e t r a  P a k
The Tetra Pak company started in 1951 in Sweden66 with a single product, the 
tetrahedron-shaped package, known as ‘Tetra Pak Standard*67. The next step 
was the development of the original aseptic carton packaging system in 1962 
which made use of the cold sterilisation method68. The company expanded 
spectacularly following the introduction in 1969 of the revolutionary Tetra 
brik aseptic packaging system69.
Ruben Rausing, the founder of Tetra Pak, did not allow Tetra Pak to di­
versify away from the packaging of beverages and other liquid food. However, 
Tetra kept expanding outside Sweden. Between 1974 and 1980, Rausing’s in­
vention caught on big in Europe and Japan. During those years, Tetra Pak’s 
sales grew by 30 per cent annually. In 1985 it had a worldwide turnover of 
around 2000 million Ecu, in 1987 of 2400 million Ecu and approximately of
66More precisely, in Lund.
67This product was developed by Ruben Rausing in the late 40s. Ruben was inspired by 
his wife while she was stuffing sausage casings.
“ W ith hydrogen peroxide, invented in the late 50s. W ith this method, the milk could 
stay fresh in the carton for months at a  time.
e9This allowed liquids to  be hermetically sealed in cartons.
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3600 million Ecu in 1990. Tetra Pak’s largest market is Europe (54 per cent 
of turnover), followed by Asia (26 per cent), North and South America (12 
per cent) and Africa (5 per cent)70. Tetra Pak is already seriously involved in 
carton packaging in Eastern and Central European countries71. Moreover it 
is on its way to establishing a production system similar to that already set 
up in Western Europe72.
In 1986 Tetra acquired three companies of the Liquipak Group, which spe­
cialised in the development and manufacture of filling equipment for liquid 
food products. At the beginning of 1991, Tetra Pak took over Alfa-Laval, a 
manufacturer of food, agricultural and industriad process equipment. Tetra 
Pak controls 90 to 95 per cent of the aseptic sector in the European Commu­
nity.
The company is still wholly-owned by the Rausings73. This makes Tetra 
a family concern, for which reason there is no public information about the 
company.
70Figures of 1989.
71Since 1990 the main growth areas lay outside Western Europe: Eastern Europe, Asia 
and the USA.
72This system comprises of sales offices, packaging material plants, machines assembly 
factories and service centers.
raHans and Gad Rausing, the two sons of Ruben Rausing.
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E l o p a k
Elopak is a Norwegian group of companies created in 195774. It is the main 
competitor of Tetra Pak in the outfiting75 of cartons for use in packaging and 
distribution for fresh liquid food. Its activities have not yet been extended to 
the aseptic sector76.
In 1987 Elopak acquired Purepak, the packaging-machine division of Ex­
cello (USA)77. Elopak is primarily engaged in Europe but also in Africa and 
the Middle East. In 1985 Elopak controlled the 27 per cent of the non-aseptic 
sector78. In 1987, it had a worldwide turnover of around 300 million Ecu79.
O t h e r  F i r m s
The only competitor of Tetra in the aseptic sector is PKL which is controlled 
by a Swiss company80. PKL’s market share is approximately 5 to 10 per cent 
of the sector. PKL produces also in the non-aseptic sector, in which it holds 
approximately 11 per cent of the market.
74Its subsidiary in Milan (Italy) was established in 1969.
^ I t  supplies and installs systems for filling, packaging and handling the cartons. How­
ever, Elopak did not manufacture the filling machines until the 80s. It just acted as a
distributor for certain filling-machine manufacturers (Liquipak among others).
76Before the Tetra Pak’s acquisition of Liquipak, Elopak had entered into a distribution 
agreement with Liquipak for machines capable of aseptically filling UHT treated milk. See 
'Tetra Pak I ’, p. 272/31 for more details.
77Purepak has been trying to develop aseptic packaging machines.
reI assume this is an average percentage over all Member States of the Community.
79These are figures from the ‘T etra Pak I ’ and ‘Tetra Pak II’ EC decisions.
®°PKL produces cartons and machines in both aseptic and non-aseptic sectors.
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The rest of the non-aseptic sector is shared by small firms. In the pro­
duction of carton packaging there are three firms, Shouw Packing (Denmark) 
which controlls 7 per cent, Mono-Emballage/Scalpak (France/Netherlands) 
which has 2.5 per cent of the sector and Van Mierlo (Belgium) with 0.5 per 
cent 81. In the production of non-aseptic machines, approximately ten small 
firms share 13 per cent of the market left by Tetra, Elopak and PKL 82. Tetra, 
Elopak and PKL are occasional distributors of these small firms.
II.3.2 Products and Relevant Market
Different definitions of the relevant market have been used concerning the 
Tetra Pak case. On one hand, in Tetra Pak I and II, the Commission distin­
guished four markets: the aseptic cartons, the supply of machines used for 
filling aseptic cartons, non-aseptic cartons, and the machines that fill them. 
On the other hand, Tetra claimed that the market is defined as the market 
of packaging, including carton, glass, plastic, etc.
The correct definition of relevant market is one of the major problems 
when analysing the activity of a specific industry and especially when decid­
ing whether a firm behaves competitively or not. Among the factors that 
are considered in the literature on antitrust practices to be a good basis 
for determining a market we can find price sensitivity measured in terms of
81These three firms produce their own carton package and their market is concentrated
in ju st one or two countries. They do not produce machines but they occasionaly distribute 
them.
“ Mainly Nimco (USA) with 4%, Cherry Burrel (USA) with 2.5% and Shikoku (Japan) 
with 0.5%.
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cross-elasticity of demand83, cross-elasticity of supply 84, movements in rela­
tive price and quantities, and clustering85. In terms of competition policy, it 
has been said that no one method will always work and that, in certain set­
tings, it may be true that no method would yield unambiguous results86. Each 
specific case may require a specific way of looking at the relevant market87.
The activity of Tetra Pak includes two main sectors, the aseptic88 and the 
non-aseptic89. Non-asepticaUy packaged products cannot be stored for a long 
time so that they need a very rapid and regular distribution system and there 
is always the risk of waste. The aseptic package gives to the product a ‘shelf 
life’ of several months.
Under this definition, there are varieties of an ‘aseptic product’ and va­
rieties of a ‘non-aseptic product’. Different varieties in the same sector are 
close substitutes. These two sectors define the number of products as well as 
of relevant markets. As far as the machines are concerned, they are part of 
the technology necessary for the production of the different packaging modes
“ in the sense th a t products are in the same market if cross-elasticity is sufficiently high so 
th a t the price of a commodity tends to uniformity, allowance being made for transportation 
costs. See Steiner [1968].
“ W ith the meaning th a t two producers can be regarded as competitors even though 
they may be currently producing products which are not competitive from the point of 
view of consumers. See Glassman [1980].
8SIf the firm involved is a multiproduct firm. See Schaerr [1985].
86See Glassman [1980].
87See also Steiner [1968].
88Free from infection.
89Used for packaging of fresh products.
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and therefore90, they should be treated as an input of the packaging produc­
tion process. In the Tetra Pak case, I distinguish a market for two different 
varieties which belong, respectively, to two different sectors, the aseptic and 
the non-aseptic sectors.
In addition, the two sectors are related. On one hand, there is a demand 
relation between them since varieties of both sectors may be substitutes91. 
On the other hand, I would expect that a production relation exists between 
aseptics and non-aseptics. The Commission does not explicitly refer to any 
effect of the co-existence of the two types of products in the production line 
of the same firm. Nevertheless, it is plausible to assume that a producer of 
both aseptic and non-aseptic products experiences some savings in the fixed 
costs of production or that the production of one type of products affects unit 
production costs of the other type (e.g. in the case of economies of scale in 
the use of one input which is common to the production of both products92).
Aseptic Sector
The product of Tetra is a board tube head sealed at intervals through the 
liquid it contains and formed into a brik-shaped pack with no headspace. The 
entire process is continuous and takes place in a single machine that shapes
90Since they are products that are in a stage prior to the process of production and 
normally not destinated to be sold.
9lFor example, if I want to buy fresh milk but, at the moment of the purchase I consider
the price too high, or I find out that there is only UHT milk left, I am likely to consider 
buying UHT milk instead.
9aSee Baumol et al. [1982].
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and fills the package. Tetra produces two varieties of aseptic carton package®3:
- Tetra Brik Aseptic, introduced in 1969/70, uses a six layer laminate94. 
The cartons are supplied in continuous rolls. The carton is formed and sealed 
on all sides at the same time as it is filled. Tetra brik aseptic cartons account 
for over 70 per cent of all Tetra Pak containers.
- Tetra Top, introduced recently, is redosable and is available in round 
and square versions95.
PKL is the only competitor of Tetra Pak in this sector. It produces the 
PKL brik, named Combi bloc96. PKL produces also the machines for filling 
these cartons.
The aseptic package of carton, in different sizes, is used for juices, wine, 
flavoured beverages, dairy drinks and other liquid food97.
"Tetra Pak produces its own machines for filling these cartons. Tetra also produces 
equipment to facilitate the handling and storage of filled packages.
MThe laminate consists of an outside polyethylene coating, printing ink, paper, a lami­
nated polyethylene layer, aluminium foil and two internal polyethylene coating layers, or 
75% paper, 20% polyethylene and 5% aluminium foil by weight.
95The package of 1 It. is the only aseptic version of Tetra Top.
96This carton is supplied as an individual flattened preformed blank only requiring sealing 
after filling.
97Nearly the 90% of the cartons produced are used for milk or milk-based products.
UHT and sterilized milk are aseptically packed. See EC Commission decision [1988] ‘Tetra 
Pak I’ for details.
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Non-Aseptic Sector
Tetra Pak produces five different non-aseptic carton packages98:
- Tetra Classic (or ‘Standard’), introduced in 1952 and formed from a roll 
of polyethylene coated board, wound into a tube during the filling process 
and then sealed through the liquid contents, so that no air is trapped inside.
- Tetra Brik. rectangular, based on the same principle used in the Tetra 
Classic99.
- Tetra Rex, introduced in 1965, is a more traditional package with a 
pointed or flat top, used for pasteurised or fresh products.
- Tetra King dates back to 1981. It is based on an expanded polystyrene 
laminate and it features a reclosable pull-tab or a lid. It is used mainly for 
specialised dairy products.
- Tetra Top in its non-aseptical version.
Elopak produces the carton package Pure Pak which competes directly 
with the Tetra Rex100.
PKL competes in the non-aseptic sector with its packages Quadrobloc and 
Pergabloc. It produces the machines associated with them.
“ Tetra produces also the machinery that goes with them. However, about 90% of the 
turnover in 1990 was in packages while 10% was in packaging machines.
" I t  was first launched in 1963.
100Elopak started its production of machines when it acquired Purepak. Before that, it 
has been a distributor, while producing some material for machine maintenance.
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IL3.3 Technological Background
The technology which was the object of the license101 assigned to Tetra in 1986 
is based on the synergy of ultra violet light (UVL) and hydrogen peroxide102. 
With the basic sterilization process as a first requisite, much development 
on both the filling machine and carton were still necessary. In fact, the 
only technically acceptable aseptic carton packaging machines commercially 
available in the EEC for long shelf life treated liquid food103 are the Tetra and 
PKL machines, both based on similar sterilization methods104. This method 
of sterilization105 used by Tetra Pak and PKL is considered by Elopak as 
adequate for cartons supplied in continuous rolls (such as the Tetra brik) but 
it is less suited to gable-top cartons106 such as those in which Elopak has 
experience107. Then, the ‘non-entry’ of Elopak in the production of aseptics
101See EC Commission decision [1988], ‘Tetra Pak I \
102UVL enhances greatly the sterilizing properties of the hydrogen peroxide.
103Especially the UHT treated milk. In fact some packaging machines for UHT liquids 
being developed or currently available are not suitable for milk but may be adequate for 
fruit juices.
104The other machines capable of packing aseptically UHT milk are either not available 
in the EEC and/or are no more than prototypes not effectively commercially exploited.
105Which is not patented.
106These cartons are lined with polyethylene and can be easily opened. They are used 
especially for the pasteurized or fresh milk. Machines developed to seal gable-top cartons 
cannot normally seal brik cartons. Even for a gable-top machine or a brik machine, the 
cartons must be adapted to fit the particular machine.
107The key for entering the market for supplying cartons for long shelf life food products 
lies in the ability to supply aseptic packaging machines for these cartons. A machine
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may result from Elopak’s inflexible technology108.
Nearly 90 per cent of cartons, whether for aseptic or for fresh liquids, axe 
used for milk or milk-based products. Milk in cartons is normally sold in one 
of two ways, either pasteurized (fresh) or aseptic (UHT-treated and sterilized 
milk). Cartons in both cases, aseptic and non-aseptic packaging, are made 
from paper-based boards of different weights and thicknesses depending on 
the specification required.
In the multi-layer liquid aseptic cartons109, the polyethylene layer is the 
only material directly in contact with the product packaged. The board 
makes the packaging strong, the plastic renders it hermetic and the aluminium 
protects the product from light and oxygen and enables the packaging to be 
dealt by induction from outside.
Tetra has patented not only the technology concerning machines and car­
ton packaging but also all the posterior modifications to those products110. 
Tetra holds more than hundred patents concerning the cartons and also more 
than hundred patents for the machines.
Due to technological reasons, entry into the aseptic packaging sector is 
difficult for a non-aseptic packaging producer. However, it is relatively easy
producer must not only have an adequate sterilization technique for the cartons, but must 
also be able to incorporate this technique into a reliable filling machine capable not only of 
working continuously and reliably at high speeds but also of maintaining an aseptic-sterile 
environment in dairy conditions. These are the technical barriers to entry for production 
of machines.
108See Roller and Tombak [1990],
109Produced by Tetra Pak.
110As, for example, the way of plaiting the carton.
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for a producer in the aseptic sector to enter the non-aseptic packaging for 
fresh liquid food.
II.3.4 Demand and Distribution Processes
Within the European Community, Tetra Pak has an assembly plant in Italy. 
It has production plants in Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Nether­
lands, Portugal and Spain. Tetra Pak has never granted licenses for the pro­
duction of its machines111.
In the Community, firms of the Tetra Pak group distribute carton packages 
and machines directly to the milk firms, dairies and supermarkets. No inde­
pendent distributor, except the distributors of Liquipak, distribute Tetra’s 
products so that not much inter-brand competition is possible.
The machines produced by Tetra Pak are either rented or sold to its 
customers, and serviced through its own service centers. Tetra makes lease 
contracts for machines in five countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom) and sales contracts in all State Members except Greece and 
Spain112.
The different types of packages and the different milks with which they are 
generally associated113 have different characteristics, which lead consumers to 
regard them as imperfect substitutes. Each type of milk has different taste
111For the production of packages, Tetra has granted some licenses to several non EEC
countries.
113See EC Commission decision [1991], Tetra Pak II’, for details on the clauses of these 
contracts.
113Glass bottles, plastic bottles, plastic bags and gable-top cartons for fresh milk. Brik 
cartons for UHT milk. Plastic bottles, metal fan« and glass bottles for sterilized milk.
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and preservation qualities. Fresh milk is normally more expensive because 
it cannot be stored. Preserved milks (UHT and sterilized) can be produced 
during the seasons in which milk is cheaper and available in greater quantities 
for consumption when fresh milk is more expensive. Sterilized milk can be 
stored longer than UHT milk but is generally regarded as having an inferior 
taste. For historical and national reasons, differences in habits, tastes and 
preferences, structural trends in the demand for the various types of packages 
may be different in different Member States114.
II.4 The issue of ‘Dominance’
Following Article 86 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome ‘any abuse by one or more 
undertakings of a dominant position within the Common Market or in a sub­
stantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common Mar­
ket in so far as it may affect trade between Member States’115.
In a 1965 memorandum, the Commission asserted that dominance is ‘pri­
marily a matter of economic potency, or the ability to exert on the operation 
of the market an influence that is substantial...’. In other words, dominance 
can only be proved by the existence of abusive conduct and where the latter 
is absent so is dominance116.
114In France, only one third of the milk consumed is fresh compared with two-thirds in 
the Community as a whole. In Germany, about 60% of milk is fresh. In Italy, glass bottles 
for fresh milk are virtually unknown because the distribution infrastructure does not exist.
n5Therefore, under this Regulation, the EEC does not prohibit the creation or strength­
ening of a dominant position, but only its abuse.
116The Court’s judgements in the cases United Brands [1978] and Boffman-La Roche
[1979] made clear that their extremely large market shares (80 per cent in the Hoffman-La
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Dominance has also been said to exist once a market share of the order 
of 40-50 per cent is reached, but this does not automatically give control so 
that other factors must be taken into account117.
Different Member States have placed different emphasis on the criteria 
to be used to establish the existence of a dominant position. One main 
instrument of German competition policy118 is the control of the market 
behaviour of market-dominating enterprises. Since 1973, the law defines a 
market-dominating enterprise as one which has no competitors119, one which 
is not exposed to any substantial competition or one which has a paramount 
market position in relation to its competitors. A paramount market posi­
tion can be identified for a dominant single firm which has a market share of
Roche case) constitute evidence of dominance. However, at times, the Court seems to 
have had some difficulty in setting aside its misgivings about a dominant firm’s conduct. 
Example of the last are ambiguous statements such as ‘a finding that an undertaking has 
a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination but simply means that the undertaking 
concerned has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted 
competition on the common markets’. See Gyselen [1990] for details.
117For example, the degree of vertical integration, the control over the distribution pro­
cess, the number of competitors, the degree of potential competition, the market share of 
firms ranked immediately below the leader, advertising expenditure, leadership in technical 
knowledge and success in defending market shares. See George and Jacquemin [1990].
118German Law Against Restraints of Competition, 1957.
U9This does not seem to me a good definition of dominant firm since what differentiates 
a dominant firm from a monopolist is the fact that the dominant firm faces a fringe of 
small competitors. See Martin [1990].
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one-third or more120, and for dominant oligopolies a market share of one-half 
or more for the biggest three firms or a share of two-thirds or more for the 
biggest five firms121.
The monopoly legislation122 in the UK, says that a market may be liable 
to investigation when two or more companies together have a market share 
of at least 25 per cent and acts in a way that prevents, restricts or distorts 
competition.
Competition authorities in France123 examine the importance of market 
share both in absolute terms and relatively to the market share of the competi­
tors of a firm. However, a large market share is considered in itself insufficient 
to establish a dominant position124.
In view of the legal meaning of dominance, it seems that, although a large 
market share is not a proof of dominance, it has been used in practice as the
120The American jurisdiction of Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not cover firms with 
less than 60%. See Kantzenb&ch [1990].
121Most of the big companies would fall under this definition. To my opinion, this is too 
narrow a definition of a dominant firm that clearly is against the existence of oligopolies.
122Governed by the Fair TYading Act 1973 and the Competition Act 1980.
123Ordonnance No. 86-1243 du ier decembre, 1986 relative à la liberté des prix et de la 
concurrence.
124In addition to market shareT competition authorities also take into consideration factors 
which may affect the possibility for competitors to develop their market shares or for 
potential entrants to actually enter the market considered: upward or downward vertical 
integration of the firm under investigation, superior management, technical superiority or 
product and image differentiation. They also take into account whether or not the firm 
under investigation belongs to a large financial group or holds monopoly power on unrelated 
markets. See Jenny [1990].
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most125 important measure of market power when assessing a firm’s position 
in the market.
The best known economic conceptualization of a ‘dominant firm ’ is in 
terms of a particular sort of price leadership136. Although not satisfactorily 
considered in the economic literature, Scherer [1980] defines dominance in 
terms of relative firm size127 which is just one of many possible consequences 
of a dominant firm128.
Other possible definitions of dominance introduce the concept of ‘differ­
ential movement advantage’ (DMA)129. In this sense, a dominant firm is a 
firm which has access to a DMA that can be exploited by making som e cred­
ible commitment which pre-empts rivals, and thus restricts the scope of their 
actions130. However, the fact that a dominant firm can keep entrants out 
does not mean that it will choose to do so. A dominant firm will pursue the 
strategy that yields the largest profit. If it will reap a greater profit by letting 
a rival into the market than by deeping it out, it will prefer to let the rival
12*If not the only one.
126According to Geroeki and Jacquemin [1984], this is an unprofitable distinction evaded 
by the apparent follower and assumed perforce by the apparent leader. See also Scherer
[1980].
127He uses ‘roughly 40% or more of its industry output’ as a criterion to deline a dominant 
firm.
128See Geroeki and Jacquemin [1984].
129The ability of a firm to precommit itself to a strategic position which narrows the range 
of replies open to its rival. See Geroski and Jacquemin [1984].
130This definition is compatible with the one that defines a dominant firm in terms of 
some ‘specific advantage', for example, the control of a natural resource base, a distribution 
network, a patent, etc.
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In a second stage of dominance, there are tactics a dominant firm can 
employ to influence fringe firms’ costs and beliefs about the way the dom­
inant firm will react to fringe behaviour. In this way, once a firm achieves 
a dominant position132, it can employ strategic behaviour to maintain that 
position133. For example, it may raise rivals’ costs, invest in excess capacity, 
integrate vertically, differentiate its production through research and devel­
opment or offer exclusive dealing contracts to consumers134.
Tetra Pak qualifies as a dominant firm under some of these definitions, 
but only in the aseptic sector. Tetra’s 1985 market share in the aseptic sector 
was more than 50 per cent in all Member States135. In addition to this large 
market share, Tetra Pak almost totally controls the distribution process of 
its products and, what is even more important, is a leader in the technical 
knowledge of machines for filling aseptic cartons. Under the definition of 
dominance given by George and Jacquemin [1990], Tetra Pak is a dominant 
firm in the aseptic sector of packaging for liquid food.
With respect to the non-aseptic sector, the only conclusion one can reach
131See Martin [1990].
132Firms may achieve a dominant position by superior competitive performance, by 
merger, or by strategic behaviour designed to exclude competitors and prevent compe­
tition on the merits.
13SThis, however, goes beyond my analysis here.
134See Martin [1990] and Geroski and Jacquemin [1984] for an extensive analysis on the 
sustainability of dominance.
135This is true for machines and for cartons, with the only exception of Ireland in the 
case of cartons.
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is that Tetra’s position in the non-aseptic sector does not fall into any of the 
given definitions of dominance136 and, therefore, it would be incorrect to talk 
about an abuse of dominance in that sector. It seems correct to look for a 
better explanation of what the position of Tetra is in the non-aseptic sector, 
and elaborate empiricaly this aspect of the case137.
II.5 Debating “Tetra Pak II”
Section 2 was mainly an introduction to the procedural characteristics of
the Tetra Pak case. This section follows the evolution of the case after the
publication of the ‘Tetra Pak II’ decision in July 1991. More specifically,
it describes the steps taken by Tetra Pak and the European Commission in
order to defend their positions138. In particular, and due to the complexity
of the case, I focus on the arguments that relate to dominance, the problem
that constitutes the main interest of this part.
After a juridical evaluation of the case, the Commission decided that139:
“... one should remember that the Court of Justice has considered as evidence 
of a dominant position market shares that are lower than the ones considered 
here. Moreover, in some Member States, Tetra Pak’s market shares in the 
non-aseptic sector are such that there is, with no doubt, a dominant posi­
tion even in the case that a different approach would consider these markets
I36Except in the German definition.
137See Section 6.
13*Three consultants have been analysing the case since, Professor Manfred Neumann, 
in the part of the Commission, and Professor Christian von Weizsäcker and Dr. Derek 
Morris, in the part of Tetra Pak.
139‘Tetra Pak II’ [1991], p. 72/21.
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separately.”
Tetra Pak’s main disagreement with the Commission140 is based on a 
different market definition adopted by Tetra Pak. Tetra defines the relevant 
market as the set of packaging modes -  carton, glass bottles, plastic, etc.
-  for liquid food141. In this market, Tetra supplies aseptic and non-aseptic 
packaging integrated systems142. Furthermore:
the relevant market can not longer be defined only in terms of cross price 
elasticity. The Commission’s formula is inappropriate because it neglects 
competitive parameters other than price143.”
M... since it is true that long-term competitive pressure accomplishes benefi­
cial results for customers then it does not make sense to exclude long-term 
substitution possibilities from the relevant market of a given product. Oth­
erwise the relevant market does not capture the competitive pressures and 
opportunities”.
This feature of the Tetra Pak case is similar to the analysis of the 'Ce/- 
lophane case in which the firm duPont was accussed of having monopoly
140Remember that the Commission identifies four relevant markets, for machines and 
for cartons in the aseptic and non-aseptic fields respectively. The disagreement between 
the Commission and Tetra Pak concerning market definition and dominance derives from 
differences between short-term and long-term substitutability. The reason for the Commis­
sion to consider four relevant markets is that all different modes of packaging compete with 
each other only in the long term. In the short term, the demand and supply conditions 
are such that the elasticity of substitution of all these packages is ‘almost’nule. See ‘Tetra 
Pak II\ p. 72/18.
141Under this definition of the market, Tetra Pak has a market share of 14%.
142Carton packaging machinery and the cartons in which various food products are packed.
143von Weizsäcker [1989].
144United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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power in cellophane. In this case, the court defined the market for cellophane
to be the relevant market. However, the trial court determined that the
relevant market consisted of all ‘flexible wrapping materials’, meaning that
duPont had a relatively low market share145.
Tetra Pak introduces146 the ‘correct’ and ‘realistic9 idea of competition. 
The structural changes147 experienced by the European Economic Community 
in the last three decades could imply that the criterion followed in measur­
ing the degree of competition in the market should also change. Tetra Pak 
concludes:
“The Commission is in error to consider Tetra Pak to be dominant in a 
market for aseptic cartons. As long as new fields of application for aseptic 
carton exist, there is no doubt that Tetra is under competitive pressure which 
corresponds to the average in the Community economy”
Furthermore, Tetra observes that148:
“There is no justification for the Commission including fruit juice and other 
liquid food in a relevant market defined in terms of aseptic carton packaging.
Those products can be packed equally well non-aseptically and/or in contain­
ers other than cartons and the distinction between long-life and short-life for
145This case was analysed following criteria of cross-elasticity of demand: “Given that a 
slight decrease in the price of cellophane causes a considerable number of consumers of other 
flexible wrappings to switch to cellophane, it is an indication that a high cross-elasticity of 
demand exists between them, that the products compete in the same market”.
146von Weizsacker [1989].
147Such as the shift occurred from the manufacturing sector to the service sector, the 
shift of employment from the activity of production to other activities like research and 
development, sales and marketing, etc, that contribute to increases in costs, an increas­
ing degree of customer choice, are some of the mentioned factors that have caused those 
structural changes.
14ivon Weizsacker and Morris [1991].
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these products is much less clear cut in terms of both production methods 
and in the eyes of consumers. Consequently, at least for non-milk products, 
the evident substitutability between aseptic and non-aseptic packaging makes 
any definitions that place these in different relevant markets inappropriate for 
assessing competitive pressures or market power”.
According to Tetra Pak, as far as the sector of non-aseptic carton pack­
aging is concerned, there are widespread and substantial longer-term substi­
tution possibilities facing carton packaging suppliers, including glass bottles 
and plastic bottles. They assert that this assures not only the existence of 
high competitive pressure in the non-aseptic sector but also the existence of 
competitive prices.
In ‘Tetra Pak II’, the Commission clearly reiterates the idea that aseptic 
and non-aseptic cartons form distinct relevant markets. However, the decision 
goes on to argue that, though distinct, these two markets are ‘related’149. It 
goes on to assert that, as a result, abuses can and have occurred on the 
non-aseptic market by virtue of dominance on the aseptic sector, that this 
conclusion is legally and economically justified and that, as a result, Tetra 
Pak is dominant in the non-aseptic sector. This seems to constitute a new 
definition of a dominant firm. Under this definition, a firm is dominant with 
respect to a market y if it is considered to be dominant, in the view of the past 
legal experience, in a different market x that is ‘related’ to market y. This is a 
rather rough concept in itself, especially because it is of a tautological nature. 
I am convinced that the case needs more attention. The Commission should 
apply a theoretical model which is appropriately designed to describe the 
main features of the Tetra Pak case with particular emphasis on the degree
149The Commission does not specify the meaning of this ‘relation’.
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of substitutability between aseptic and non-aseptic products.
II.6 Empirical Evidence
I use the data available from the Tetra Pak case to test the decision taken 
by the EC Commission concerning the relation between the aseptic and non­
aseptic sectors. I also test how this relation can determine the position of the 
competing firms in each sector.
Since the decision affects all European countries, I use cross-section data 
which are available on the Tetra Pak case which refer to the EC Member 
States for the year 1985. This implies a total of 12 observations for each 
variable.
Figure 11 shows the relation between Tetra Pak’s market shares in the 
two different sectors150. The correlation between Tetra Pak’s market share in 
the aseptic sector and that in the non-aseptic sector, using data of 1985 for 
all countries that constitute the geographical market, is151 pa>na = 0.2. When 
the Commission expresses its opinion saying that 152:
“It will also be noticed that the rank order of market shares for cartons in 
the aseptic and the non-aseptic sectors are closely associated”153.
it is implicitly refering to a positive correlation between market shares in the
150See Appendix 1.
151This correlation rises to 0.65 in the case of Italy over the time period 1977-1986.
152Neumann [1992].
153As a matter of fact, the market share for cartons in the aseptic sector for Ireland is
below the 50 per cent. What Neumann says regarding this observation is that ‘this low 
figure may be due to incomplete information’. To my opinion, this argument cannot be 
valid since, as the EC Commission Decision, it is based on the available data.
98
two sectors. The correlation between the market share of Tetra Pak in the two 
sectors, although low, is in fact positive, which can be considered to confirm 
the Commission’s claim. Since aseptic find non-aseptic products are defined 
to be demand substitutes, this relation would be expected to be negative154. If 
only demand relations exist between the aseptic and the non-aseptic sectors, a 
positive relation might be a result of Tetra Pak’s anti-competitive behaviour, 
although this fact alone would not be sufficient to prove it.
As a first approach to an empirical analysis of the Tetra Pak case, I propose 
a regression analysis using the same data as the Commission. Following the 
EC Commission’s criteria, Tetra’s position in the aseptic sector explains its 
position in the non-aseptic sector.
Table D summarises the variables used in the present analysis155:
Ta ble  D
Summary of Variables
Var. Name of the Variable Mean Std. Deviation
Y T.Pak’s m. share non-asep. (cartons) 48.52 23.85
X i T.Pak m .share aseptics (cartons) 80.17 23.44
x2 T.Pak’s m. share aseptics (machines) 91.21 12.33
X 3 T.Pak’s prices Rex (machines) 123.3 20.25
xA T.Pak’s prices aseptics (machines) 173.3 30.62
X* T.Pak’s m. share non-asep. (machines) 54.8 18.61
x6 Elopak’s m. share (cartons) 27.81 12.88
x7 Herfindahl index aseptics (cartons) 0.78 0.2
Xs Herfindahl index non-asep. (cartons) 0.4 0.21
164See Bulow et al. [1985]. They expect a negative relation.
155Source: Annexes of the EC Commision Decision, ‘Tetra Pak II*, L 72/1, 24 July 1991.
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The unrestricted156 model is used as the starting point to study the ex­
planatory power of some of the independent variables157. The model is ini­
tially specified as follows:
X a i  =  or +  +  @ 3X 3i +  f c X s i  +  f i j X n  +  Ci
i =  1...12 (11.11)
where e,- is distributed as a Normal(0,l).
In a first step of the analysis, a variable that gives global information 
about the non-aseptic sector is the Herfindalh index of that sector (variable 
Xsi) which is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables axe: Tetra 
Pale’s market share in the aseptic sector for machines (variable X2), the prices 
charged by Tetra Pak for the non-aseptic Rex machines ( A 3 ) ,  Tetra Pak’s 
market share in the non-aseptic sector for machines (As) and the Herfindahl 
index of the aseptic sector (X7).
Results from this first model reflect more or less what one would have 
expected. That is, the explanatory variables that explain Tetra Pak’s market 
share in the non-aseptic sector for cartons are Tetra Pak’s market share in 
the non-aseptic sector for machines (As), prices charged by Tetra Pak for 
the Rex (non-aseptic) machines (A3) and the Herfindahl index of the aseptic 
sector for cartons ( A 7 ) 158 .
156The most general model includes all relevant variables for which there are data 
available.
157Since Tetra and Elopak compete in the non-aseptic sector, Elopak’s market shares in 
the sector for cartons is negatively correlated, with (py,xt — —1), to Tetra’s market share 
in the non-aseptic sector for cartons. This leads to the elimination of X&.
‘“ With $3 =  0 . 0 0 4 4 , =  0.006 and 07 =  0.533.
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However, it is remarkable to observe that the Herfindahl index is a cen­
sored dependent variable159. In particular, the minimum value of the Herfind­
ahl index for an industry composed by n firms is not zero but the value of 
this index that would correspond to an industry that has n firms with equal 
market shares (5,- = 1/t}, i = l...n). For the analysis of a censored variable, 
it is necessary to apply a Tobit model160.
Given that not all firms produce in all countries involved in the case161,1 
take162 n = 5 and, therefore, Hm = 0.2 is the lower bound of the Herfindahl 
index as the dependent variable of the model.
Different Tobit models have been tested in this analysis. The general 
formulation of this model is such that,
X ’Gi = ffX *  + 6,
*6,
X*
where Xki is the vector of explanatory variables and /? is the vector of 
parameters /?,• which measures the marginal effect of each explanatory variable 
in the model.
The dependent variable is the Herfindahl index of the non-aseptic sector 
for cartons. I have also used as a dependent variable of the same model, the
159In the sense that values in a certain range are all reported as a single value.
160Conventional regression models fail to account for the qualitative difference between 
limit observation and noniimit observations. See Greene [1993].
161See Appendix 2.
16aThe maximum number of firms supplying all countries.
=  0.2 if X6, < 0 . 2  (H.12)
=  x ; { if * ;  >  0.2
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transformed index163 H/( 1 — H),
As far as the significance of the explanatory variables is concerned, it is 
of interest to emphasise some of the results obtained. First, Tetra Pak’s mar­
ket share in the non-aseptic sector for machines (variable As) is invariably 
good in explaining the concentration degree of the non-aseptic sector. This 
is the case also for the prices charged by Tetra Pak for the non-aseptic Rex 
machines (A3) and for the Herfindahl index in the aseptic sector for cartons 
( A 7 ) .  Therefore, results confirm what it was already obtained trough stan­
dard regression analysis. Moreover, the marginal effect that those variables 
have in the model is the highest within the set of all explanatory variables. 
In particular, = 0.5, #3 = 0.68, /?7 = 0.65.
This can be considered as the first signal that the aseptic sector may 
explain the non-aseptic sector. However, it is still too general as a result. 
Going beyond this general result, I intend to focus on Tetra Pak and its 
position in the specific sector of non-aseptics. In this case, the unrestricted 
model becomes:
Yi = a + A Ait + /S2A2, + &A3 ,• -|- $4X4 i -+■ A&, + e,-
i = 1...12 (11.13)
The additional explanatory variables are Tetra Pak’s market share in the 
aseptic sector for cartons ( A j ) and the prices charged by Tetra Pak for the 
aseptic machines ( A 4 ) .
However, although these variables are taken a priori as explanatory vari­
ables, there is a structural relationship between them. Therefore, it is nec­
essary to test for the simultaneity bias of including variables X\ to A 5 . The
163In this case, the minimum value is equal to 0.25.
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specification test devised by Hausman (1978) and later by Spencer and Berk
(1981)164 provides a method of testing for exogeneity in a single equation with 
more than one endogenous variable165. The test statistic is w = 0.0001 < 3.84 
and, thus, the hypothesis of exogeneity is not rejected.
The matrix of correlation among the variables of this model leads me to 
the following remarks: first, prices charged by Tetra for the aseptic and non­
aseptic machines are highly correlated (px3fx4 = 0.84). This may be due to 
differences across countries and a consequent ‘pricing to market’166.
Second, there is a negative correlation between Tetra’s market share and 
prices of machines (px3lxs = —0.07) in the non-aseptic sector and also a 
negative correlation of the corresponding variables, (px7fx4 = —0.1), in the 
aseptic sector167.
The estimation of the original model leads to the restricted model168:
164They introduced a single-equation version of the Hausman test.
165The test is such that, under H0: X% is exogenous and, under under H\: X% is endoge­
nous. The statistic is distributed as a \ 2 with one degree of freedom. See Greene [1993] 
for details.
166See Krugman [1986].
167As one would have expected, I find that prices for non-aseptic machines (Rex) and 
Tetra’s market share in the aseptic sector for cartons are negatively correlated (pxXtXs = 
—0.38), and that prices for aseptic machines are negatively correlated to Tetra’s market 
share in the aseptic sector for cartons (pxitx 4 = —0.3).
168To test this, I apply a test of the overall significance of the regression excluding these 
variables. With a value of F  = 0.031 < F$, the elimination of X \, X4, and X5 does not 
significantly decrease the explanatory power of the model.
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Y» =  <* + $2X2 i + $3X3, + c,- 
i  =  1_12 (11.14)
Table E summarises the estimates of the parameters and the corresponding 
¿-statistics for the two models, the unrestricted and the restricted one.
Ta b le  E
d
(<a)
A
(y ,)
02 A
(y,)
A
<v«)
A
(y .)
R 2
SSR
Model 1 -156.23 0.345 0.6 0.72 0.02 0.53 0.7
(-2.664) (1.3) (1.17) (1.34) (0.05) (1.59) 1855.72
Model 2 -127.69 - 1.117 0.6 - - 0.5
(-2.198) - (2.44) (2.163) - - 2774.6
As a result, Tetra Pale’s market shares in the aseptic sector for machines 
and prices charged for non-aseptic machines seem to be the only variables 
which explain the market share of Tetra Pak in the non-aseptic sector for 
cartons. Both variables are negatively correlated169 which may be considered 
a signal of the degree of substitutability between aseptic and non-aseptic ma­
chines. In this sense, the position of Tetra Pak in the sector of machines, 
aseptic and non-aseptic, explain Tetra’s market share in the non-aseptic sec­
tor for cartons. This result, together with the fact that there is a positive 
correlation between Tetra Pak’s market shares in the two sectors are, up to 
now, two indications that go in the line of the Commission’s assertions. How­
ever, I believe that more information can be obtained from the data available.
= -0.14.
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II.6.1 A Logit Model
In this section, I use a logit analysis170 to empirically test the influence of 
a number of explanatory variables on the probability that Tetra Pak has a 
dominant position in the non-aseptic sector171. Given the information which 
is available, this is as far as an empirical analysis of the Tetra Pak case can 
go. I base my analysis on the report submitted by Tetra Pak to the European 
Commission172.
Based on these data, the EC Commission concludes that Tetra Pak has a 
dominant position in the sector of non-aseptics and that173:
“The data available in annexes 1.1 and 1.2 ilústrate not only the dominant 
position and even monopolistic of Tetra Pak in the aseptic sector, but also 
the first position that this group holds in the non-aseptic sector, in which it 
has a market share that can be considered by itself as a dominant position”.
It is worth emphasising that these data show, according to the European 
Commission, how Tetra Pak, using its dominant position in the aseptic sec­
tor, also dominates the sector for non-aseptics. More specifically, the EC 
Commission afirms that174:
“Tetra Pak has used the relation between the two sectors to abuse in the 
non-aseptic sector. This abuse would have never been possible if Tetra Pak
170Which is based on a qualitative response model in which the dependent variable is 
a discrete outcome. Conventional regression methods are inappropriate in these kind of 
models.
17IThe EC Commission Decision, ‘Tetra Pak II’, refers to both cartons and machines sold 
by Tetra Pak. However, I analyse this effect exclusively for the aseptic sector of cartons.
172See EC Commission Decisions, ‘Tetra Pak I’ [1988] and ‘Tetra Pak II’ [1991].
173‘Tetra Pak II’, p. 72/19.
174‘Tetra Pak II’, p. 72/22.
105
would not have a dominant position in the aseptic sector” .
Therefore, I focus on the extent to which the aseptic sector explains the 
probability of a dominant position in the non-aseptic sector, holding constant 
other potentially relevant factors that might also affect the non-aseptic sec­
tor. Following the definition of dominant position used explicitly by the EC 
Commission, I consider that high market shares are enough as an evidence of 
a dominant position, and that this is the case of a market share of 50 per cent. 
Although this may appear as a partial hypothesis test, finding that there is 
no positive effect of the aseptic sector situation on the probability of Tetra 
Pak to be dominant in the non-aseptic sector, would contradict the decision 
taken by the EC Commission.
From the investigation of the EC Commission175 I take the market shares 
of each of the firms that produce in both sectors, aseptic and non-aseptic. I use 
the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index as a measure of the market concentration 
for the aseptic sector176. I include instead the market share of Tetra Pak 
for the aseptic sector177, Elopak’s market share in the non-aseptic sector and 
prices charged by Tetra Pak in both sectors ¿is explanatory variables178, given 
that these are associated with the cited decision of the EC Commission.
175See Table D.
176ln the work presented here, I measure this index as percentages. This variable is not 
used in the first logit-model proposed because it would lead to a problem of multi colinearity.
177Ineluding cartons and machines.
178I include, as a relevant explanatory variable, the prices charged by Tetra Pak for the 
Rex machines which are considered by Elopak -in its accusation -  to be sold at abusive 
prices.
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The logit-model can be generalized as follows:
n i ^ a  + 'EPjX# 
i
i = 1...12 (11.15)
where II, is the probability that Tetra Pak has a market share bigger or 
equal to 50 per cent in the non-aseptic sector in country i. Xji refers to any 
explanatory variable j  for country t. The qualitative dependent variable is 
binary taking the value ‘1’ when Tetra Pak’s market share in the non-aseptic 
sector is bigger or equal to 50 per cent, and the value ‘O’ otherwise. Therefore, 
I use logit analysis which implies that the dependent variable is transformed 
as /n[II/(l — II)].
Two different logit-models have been tested to analyse the factors that 
could determine whether or not Tetra Pak is dominant in the non-aseptic 
sector in one specific country. My aim is to test whether, with the data 
available, one may conclude or not -  like the EC Commission did -  that the 
firm under discussion is dominant in the non-aseptic sector due to its position 
in the aseptic one.
The first model179 (model 3) analyses the effect of the level of concentra­
tion in the sector for aseptic products on the probability that Tetra is domi­
179A different logit model was tested to measure the influence of the position of Tetra 
Pak in the aseptic sector for cartons. The marginal effect on the dependent variable due 
to changes of 1 per cent in the Tetra Pak’s market share in the aseptic sector is 0.25 per 
cent. This small but positive effect is an indicator of the positive correlation between both 
sectors. This, among other reasons, can be due to the fact that Tetra Pak is able to use 
the same technology in both sectors. Moreover, the estimated parameter is not significant, 
and the model explains only a 0.008 per cent of the dependent variable and the number of 
correct predictions is very low. As a result, I find that the market share of Tetra Pak in the 
aseptic sector can not be considered a good variable to explain the probability that the firm
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nant in thenon-aseptic sector. Table F shows the results of the estimation180:
Ta b le  F
Model 3
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Marginal Effect Probability
Constant -6.89 3.940 - 0.001
H. index • 8.2 4.7 2.05 0.998
Note: H.index=Herfinc ahi index for cartons in the aseptic sector.
The effect that changes in the level of concentration of the aseptic sector 
have on the probability that Tetra Pak has a dominant position in the non­
aseptic sector is positive and equal to the 2.05 per cent. An increase of 
1 per cent in the concentration degree of the aseptic sector will result, with 
probability 0.5, in an increase of 2.05 per cent in the probability of Tetra Pak’s 
dominant position in the non-aseptic sector. It is the level of concentration 
in the aseptic sector, and not just the position of Tetra which explains Tetra 
Pak’s position in the related sector of non-aseptics.
There are three different measures to test the goodness of fit in this kind 
of models181:
1. The likelihood ratio test on the hypothesis H0 : 0j = 0 Vj, as a measure 
of the joint significance of the parameters. The likelihood ratio is distributed
has a dominant position in the non-aseptic sector, which is not what the EC Commission 
says.
180The marginal effect of each explanatory variable on the dependent variable is the 
maximum effect possible, i.e. when the probability is 0.5. The estimated value of the 
probability corresponds to the average value of the explanatory variable. This holds for 
the two models presented.
lslSee Maddala [1989] for further details on logit models.
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as a x-squared with k -  the number of explanatory variables -  degrees of 
freedom182.
2. McFadden’s pseudo R2 = 1 — logLu/logLr, where Lu is the unrestricted 
likelihood funtion and Lr is the restricted one183.
3. The proportion of correct predictions out of the total number of obser­
vations.
The goodness of fit in this model indicates that:
* X2(l) = 4.15
McFadden’s pseudo R2 = 0.25 
Number of correct predictions = 10
The null hypothesis is rejected only at significance levels lower than 95 per 
cent. This means that fi\ is not significantly different from zero at high levels 
of significance. The model explains a 25 per cent of the dependent qualitative 
variable. Although small, this positive effect would not have been expected 
if one were taking into account the relation of substitutability between the 
two sectors. As a result, the level of concentration is found to have some 
explanatory power on the dependent variable but the explanation remains 
partial.
The second logit-model (model 4) aims at explaining the position of Tetra 
Pak in the non-aseptic sector through variables that refer to Tetra in the 
aseptic sector. In particular,'Tetra’s market share in the aseptic sector (for
182This value has to be compared with the statistical value on the tables for the x-squared 
distribution that corresponds to that specific number of degrees of freedom.
183In the sense that the unrestricted likelihood is maximised with respect to all the pa­
rameters, and the restricted likelihood is maximised with respect to a  only.
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machines and cartons separately) and the prices charged by Tetra for the ma­
chines in the same sector. To avoid problems of multi colinearity, the Herfind­
ahl index is not included in this model184. Table G shows the results obtained 
from the estimation.
Ta b le  G
Model 4
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Marginal Effect Probability
Constant -288.12 5753 - 0
TP m.8. cartons (aseptic) 0.12 11.55 0.03 0.99
TP m i. machines (aseptic) 2.31 61.55 0.6 1
TP prices for machines (aseptic) 0.33 5.6 0.08 1
The marginal effects are positive185. It can be concluded that the explana­
tory variables chosen in this model explain the evolution of the market share 
that Tetra Pak has in the non-aseptic market for cartons186. Furthermore, 
the three measures of the goodness of fit are:
X*(3) =  16.3 
McFadden’s pseudo R2 =  0.99 
Number of correct predictions =  12
184The significance of this index, evident from model 3, is included in model 4 through 
Tetra Pak’s market share in the aseptic sector.
1SBIt is remarkable the significance of the marginal effect due to the market share of Tetra 
in the aseptic sector for machines.
186lneluding Tetra Pak’s prices for the Rex (non-aseptic) machines as an explanatory 
variable, does not add any more information.
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The null hypothesis is rejected at all significance levels. This means that 
0i 1 02 j 04 are significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the model ex­
plains 99 per cent of the probability of dominance of Tetra Pak in the non- 
aseptic sector. This does not confirm completely the Commission’s claims 
concerning the effect of Tetra Pak’s high market share in the aseptic sector 
on its market share in the sector for non-aseptic packaging. Other effects 
apart from that produced by the market share are also fundamental. This 
happens in particular with the prices for aseptic machines. It may be that the 
prices that Tetra charges for these machines are also the result of its domi­
nance in the aseptic sector. Of course, if not dominance, other characteristics 
of Tetra’s behaviour in the aseptic sector -  which may also, in an implicit 
way, have to do with dominance -  determine its dominance in the sector for 
non-aseptics. Nevertheless, the relation between the two sectors should be 
treated and modelled in a rigorous way.
II.6.2 Conclusions
A first attempt to study empirically the Tetra Pak case leads to the conclu­
sion that, in general, prices charged by Tetra Pak for the non-aseptic Rex 
machines, Tetra Pak’s market share for the aseptic machines and the con­
centration level of the aseptic sector for cartons, are a good measure of the 
concentration level of the non-aseptic sector of cartons.
In an analysis that focuses on Tetra’s position in the two sectors, I find 
that Tetra Pak’s market shares in the aseptic sector for machines and prices 
charged for non-aseptic machines are the only variables that could explain 
Tetra’s market share in the non-aseptic sector for cartons. The dominant 
position of Tetra in the aseptic sector for cartons seems to have no direct
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effect in its position in the non-aseptic sector.
I have used a logit approach. The data show that Tetra Pak is likely to 
be dominant in the non-aseptic sector, because of its position in the aseptic 
sector and this is expressed in the price level of aseptic machines, the market 
share for cartons and machines in the aseptic sector, as opposed to the market 
share in the aseptic sector of cartons alone.
On the other hand and given the fact that, in the absence of any produc­
tion relations between the aseptic and non-aseptic sectors, a negative relation 
between the market shares of Tetra Pak in both sectors would have been 
expected, a positive correlation between the market share of Tetra Pak for 
aseptics and the one for non-aseptics can be considered either as a sign of anti­
competitive behaviour in the part of Tetra or a signal of the existence of some 
production relation between the two types of product (aseptic-non-aseptic).
As a result of the logit-analysis of the data presented by Tetra Pak to the 
EC Commission, I have found that187 the Commission may have reached a 
correct conclusion. On one hand, Tetra Pak is likely to have behaved anti- 
competitively. On the other hand, market shares in the aseptic sector and 
prices charged for machines to produce aseptics are sufficient to explain the 
probability that Tetra Pak has a dominant position in the sector for non­
aseptic products and, perhaps, to conclude that dominance permits Tetra 
Pak to dominate also the non-aseptic sector.
187In the sense that it is a legal study with the use of economic concepts.
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II.7 Final Conclusions
A more correct notion of relevant market in the Tetra Pak case would include 
a market for two different varieties of a differentiated product, the aseptic 
and the non-aseptic. Under this definition, I have studied the Tetra Pak 
case and, more specifically, the role of the relation between the two different 
sectors, aseptic and non-aseptic, in determining Tetra Pak’s dominance in 
the non-aseptic sector. The European Commission used the relation between 
these two sectors to prove that Tetra Pak had a dominant position in the 
non-aseptic assuming that Tetra has a dominant position in the sector of 
aseptics. The factors that, in the literature, characterise a dominant firm 
do not fit with the ones that define Tetra Pak’s position in the non-aseptic 
sector. Therefore, it would be incorrect to consider Tetra’s market share in 
that sector as the one of a dominant firm.
In a first empirical regression-analysis of the data available from ‘Tetra 
Pak II’ the positive correlation between Tetra Pak’s market shares in the two 
sectors confirms the Commission’s assertion that Tetra’s market share in the 
non-aseptic sector is a result of its position in the aseptic sector. Going be­
yond that, I have proposed a logit-analysis which, based on the data available 
from the Commission’s investigations, shows that the market shares of Tetra 
in the sector for aseptic cartons and machines, as well as the prices charged 
by Tetra for the aseptic machines, are positively correlated to the probabil­
ity that Tetra Pak dominates the non-aseptic sector. However, dominance 
does not necessarily imply an abuse. Other factors like demand and supply 
conditions should be considered. For example, the possibility of a production 
relation between the two types of products has been systematically ignored. 
Therefore, one cannot conclude with certainty that the Commission is right
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to consider the relation between Tetra Pak’s shares in the two sectors as the 
result of abuse of a dominant position.
Further empirical analysis is called for. On this purpose, the Commission 
should be provided with all information necessary.
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IL8 Appendix: Figures and Data
II.8.1 Figures
Figure 1 compares Tetra Pak’s market shares in the two different sectors, the 
aseptic and the non-aseptic188. To construct the two curves, I have used the 
information given in the EC Commission Decision ‘Tetra Pak II’, p. 72/20 
and 72/10:
On one hand, according to the Commission, if one takes into consideration 
the global sector of carton packaging for liquid food, i.e. the aseptic and the 
non-aseptic sectors, the market share of Tetra Pak was, chronologically, 60% 
to 65% in 1976, 65% to 70% in 1980, 70% to 75% in 1985 and 78% in 1987. 
On the other hand, Tetra’s market share of the Italian market for non-aseptic 
packaging was 79% in 1977, 70% in 1981, 76.3
Based on this information, I have created the two series of data contained 
in Table H that correspond to Tetra Pak’s market share in the two sectors 
and that are showed in Figure 11.
Ta ble  H
Year Tetra aseptic Tetra non-aseptic
1977 81 79
1981 97.8 70
1985 98.3 76.3
1986 96.7 80.5
' «Jote: market shares are expressed in percentages.
1S8The data used are referred to Italy, since it was in this country that the Tetra Pak case 
started.
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II.8.2 The Data
The data showed in next Table K are referred to 1985.
T able  K
TABLE of DATA
Variable B DK F D GR El I NL P SP UK LU
MSTas 83.4 100 93.6 81.3 56.9 23.1 98.2 57.4 100 100 84.7 83.4
MSTna 29.6 34.5 55.8 41.9 16.7 69.2 76.3 32.1 100 55.9 40.6 29.6
MSPKLas 16.6 0 6.4 18.7 43.1 76.9 1.8 42.6 0 0 15.3 16.6
MSE 38.02 35.4 23.9 31.4 44.9 16.63 12.8 36.7 0 23.8 32.1 38.02
MSPKLna 15.5 14.4 9.7 12.8 18.3 6.8 5.2 14.94 0 9.7 13.1 15.5
MSS-P 9.9 9.2 6.2 8.1 11.66 4.3 3.3 9.5 0 6.2 8.3 9.9
MSM-E 3.5 3.3 2.2 2.9 4.17 1.54 1.2 3.4 0 2.2 3 3.5
MSV-M 0.7 0.65 0.44 0.58 0.83 0.31 0.24 0.68 0 0.44 0.6 0.7
MSOna 2.78 2.55 1.76 2.29 3.33 1.22 0.96 2.68 0 1.76 2.3 2.78
MSTas(m) 92.1 100 95.2 82 83.3 100 98.6 57.5 100 100 93.7 92.1
MSTna(m) 75 34.8 37.7 43.6 44.4 69.3 77.4 37.5 80 46.7 36.2 75
PRex 100 100 158.5 133 125 151 129 136 128 119 100 100
PMas 153 100 214 189 169 206 180 185.5 183 194 153 153
Has 0.72 1 0.88 0.69 0.51 0.64 0.96 0.51 1 1 0.74 0.72
Hnas 0.268 0.275 0.38 0.3 0.28 0.51 0.6 0.27 0.99 0.38 0.29 0.268
Source: Annexes of the EC Commision Decision, ‘Tetra Pak II’, L 72/1, 24 July 1991.
The columns correspond to the 12 countries that belong to the European 
C o m m u n i t y  Market shares are measured in percentages. Prices are indexes 
calculated after their conversion in ecus189. The variables are:
MSTas: Tetra Pak’s market share in the aseptic sector for cartons.
189Index 100 = Member State with the lower prices.
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MSTna: Tetra Pak’s market share in the non-aseptic sector for cartons. 
MSPKLas: PKL’s market market share in the aseptic sector for cartons.
MSE : Elopak’s market share in the non-aseptic sector for cartons.
MSPKLna: PKL’s market share in the carton’6 non-aseptic sector.
MSS-P : Shonw Packing’s market share (non-aseptic sector).
MSM-E : Mono-Emballage’s market share (non-aseptic sector).
MSV-M : Van-Mierlo’s market share (non-aseptic sector).
MSOna : Others’ market share in the non-aseptic sector for cartons. 
MSTas(m): Tetra Pak’s market share in the aseptic sector for machines. 
MSTna(m): Tetra Pak’s market share in the non-aseptic sector for machines. 
PRex : Prices charged by Tetra for the Rex machines (non-aseptic).
PMas : Prices charged by Tetra for the machines for aseptic cartons.
Has : Herfindahl index for the aseptic sector for cartons.
Hnas : Herfindahl index for the non aseptic sector for cartons.
118
Bibliography
[1] AYRES, I., [1985], ‘Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets’, Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 95, N 1, pp. 109-125.
[2] B a u m o l , W ., W il l ig , R . and  Pa nzaR, J .,  [1982], Contestable Mar­
kets and the Theory of Industry Structure, San Diego: Hau-court, Brace, 
Jovanovich, New York.
[3] BRESNAHAN, T.F., [1989], ‘Empirical Studies of Industries with Mar­
ket Power’, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Willig, R.D. and 
Schmalensee, R. (eds), Amsterdam: North Holland vol. II, ch. 17.
[4] B u lo w , J.I., G e a n a k o pl o s , J.D. and K l e m p e r e r , P.D., [1985], 
‘Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements’, Jour­
nal of Political Economy, vol 93, No. 3, 488-511.
[5] ‘Cellophane’, United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 351 US. 
377 (1956).
[6] EC COMMISSION, [1985], ‘Akzo’ EC Commission Decision, O.J. L 
374/1, (Case 62/86).
[7] EC COMMISSION, [1988], ‘Tetra Pak I’, EC Commission Decision, O.J. 
L 272/27, 26 July.
119
[8] EC C o m m issio n , [1991], ‘Tetra Pak II’, EC Commission Decision, O.J. 
L 72/1, 24 July.
[9] ELZINGA, K.G. and HOGARTY, T.F., [1973], ‘The Problem of Geo­
graphic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits’ Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 
18, N 1, pp. 45-81.
[10] ELZINGA, K.G. and HOGARTY, T.F., [1978], ‘The Problem of Geo­
graphic Market Delineation Revisited: the Case of Coal’, Antitrust Bul­
letin, Vol. 23, N 1, pp. 1-18.
[11] GEORGE, K ., [1990], ‘UK Competition Policy: Issues and Institutions’, 
in: Lesoume, J. and Sonnenschein, H. (eds), *Competition Policy in 
Europe and North America: Economic Issues and Institutions’, Chur: 
Harwood Academic Publishers.
[12] GEORGE, K. and J a c q u e m in , A., [1990] ‘Competition Policy in the 
European Community’, in: Lesoume, J. and Sonnenschein, H. (eds), 
‘Competition Policy in Europe and North America: Economic Issues 
and Institutions’, Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.
[13] G e r o s k i, P. A. and J a c q u em in , A., [1984], ‘Dominant Firms and their 
Alleged Decline’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol.
2, No. 1, pp.1-29.
[14] GLASSMAN, M.L., [1980], ‘Market Definition as Practical Matter’, An­
titrust Law Journal, Vol. 49, Issue 3, pp. 1155-1166.
[15] GREENE, W.H., [1993], Econometric Analysis, Macmillan Publishing 
Company, New York.
120
[16] G y se l e n , L., [1990], ‘Abuse of Monopoly Power within the Mean­
ing of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty: recent developments’, in: Barry 
Hawk (ed), ‘Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law 1992 and 
EEC/US Competition and Trade Law Ardsley-on-Hudson’, New York: 
Transnational Juris Publications Incorporated.
[17] ‘Hoffmann-La Roche ’ v. EC Commission (Vitamins), Case 85/76, Judg­
ment of 13 February 1979, 1979 ECR 461.
[18] JENNY, F., [1990], ‘French Competition Policy in Perspective’, in: 
Lesourne, J. and Sonnenschein, H. (eds), ‘Competition Policy in Europe 
and North America: Economic Issues and Institutions’, Chur: Harwood 
Academic Publishers.
[19] JOHNSON, F.I., [1986], ‘Market Definition under the Merger Guidelines: 
Critical Demand Elasticities’, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Com­
mission, Working Paper n 142.
[20] KANTZENBACH, E ., [1990], ‘Competition Polity in West Germany: 
A Comparison with the Antitrust Policy of the United States’, in: 
Lesourne, J. and Sonnenschein, H. (eds), ‘Competition Policy in Europe 
and North America: Economic Issues and Institutions’, Chur: Harwood 
Academic Publishers.
[21] K a u p e r , T., [1990], ‘Dominant Positions and their Abuse under Article 
86’, in: Barry Hawk (ed), ‘Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate 
Law 1992 and EEC/US Competition and Trade Law Ardsley-on-Hudson’, 
New York: Transnational Juris Publications Incorporated.
121
[22] KRUGMAN, P, [1986], ‘Pricing to Market when the Exchange Rate 
Changes’, NBER Working Paper No. 1926.
[23] La NGEHEINE, B., [1991], ‘Substantive Review under the EEC Merger 
Regulation’, in: Barry Hawk (ed), ‘International Mergers and Joint Ven­
tures \ 1990 Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Transnational Juris Pub­
lications.
[24] LARDARO, L ., [1993], Applied Econometrics, Harper Collins College 
Publishers.
[25] MADDALA, G.S., [1989], Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables 
in Econometrics, Econometric Society Monographs No. 3, Cambridge 
University Press.
[26] MARTIN, S., [1988], Industrial Economics: Economic Analysis and Pub­
lic Policy, 2nd ed., chapters 3 and 4, New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company.
[27] NEUMANN, M., [1992], ‘Competition in the Market for Carton Packaging 
for Liquids - The Tetra Pak Case’, unpublished Report submitted to the 
EC Commission, March.
[28] NEUMANN, M., [1993], ‘The Relevant Market and Dominance in the 
Tetra Pak Case: Rejoinder .to the Reply of Tetra Pak and the Response of 
Professor von Weizsacker and Dr. Morris’, unpublished Report submitted 
to the EC Commission, January.
[29] O r d o v e r , A ., [1990], ‘Economic Foundations of Competition Policy’, 
in: Lesoume, J. and Sonnenschein, H. (eds), ‘Competition Policy in
122
Europe and North America: Economic Issues and Institutions’, Chur: 
Harwood Academic Publishers.
[30] R ea so n er , H.M., T u r n er , D.F, G lassm an , M.L., C o llin s , W.D. 
and KAPLAN, L.A. [1980], ‘Panel Discussion on Market Definition in 
Merger and Monopolization Cases: Concepts and Techniques’. Antitrust 
Law Journal, vol. 49, Issue 3, pp. 1167-1181.
[31] ROLLER, L.H. and T o m ba k , M.M., [1990], ‘Strategic Choice of Flex­
ible Production Technologies and Welfare Implications’, The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, vol. 38, No.4, 417-431.
[32] SCHAERR, G.C., [1985], ‘The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice De­
partment’s Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers’, Yale Law Journal, Vol 
94, N 3, pp. 670-693.
[33] SCHERER, F.M., [1980], Industrial Market Structure and Economic Per­
formance, Rand McNally Chicago, IL.
[34] Sc h e f f m a n , D.T. and SPILLER, O.T., [1985], ‘Geographic Market 
Definition under the DOJ Merger Guidelines’, Working Papers in Eco­
nomics, The Hoover Institution.
[35] SHRIEVES, R.E., [1978], ‘Geographic Market Areas and Market Struc­
ture in the Bituminous Coal Industry’, Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 23, N 3, 
pp. 589-625.
[36] STEINER, P.O., [1968], ‘Markets and Industries’, in: International En­
cyclopedia of the Social Sciences, David L. Sills (ed), Macmillan Co. and 
the PYee Press, Vol. 9, pp. 575-581.
123
[37] SiRAGUSA, M., [1990], ‘Current Procedural and Litigation Aspects of 
Mergers and Takeovers’, in: Barry Hawk (ed), ‘Annual Proceedings of 
the Fordham Corporate Law 1992 and EEC/US Competition and Trade 
Law’, 1989 Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Transnational Juris Pub­
lications.
[38] TURNER, D.F. [1980], ‘The Role of the Market Concept in Untitrust 
Law’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 49, Issue 3, pp. 1145-1154.
[39] ‘United Brands’v. EC Commission, Case 27/76, Judgment of 14 Febru­
ary 1978, 1978 ECR 207.
[40] U r i , N.D., Ho w e l l , J. and R if k in , E.J., [1985], ‘On Defining Geo­
graphic Markets’, Applied Economics, Vol. 17, pp. 959-977.
[41] VENIT, J., [1991], ‘The Evaluation of Concentrations under Regulation 
4064/89: the nature of the beast’, in: Barry Hawk (ed), ‘International 
Mergers and Joint Ventures’, 1990 Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
Transnational Juris Publications.
[42] W e is s , L.W., [1972], ‘The Geographic Size of Markets in Manufactur­
ing’, Review of Economics and Statistics, pp. 245-257.
[43] VON WEIZSÄCKER, C., [1989], ‘The Issue of Dominance in the Tetra 
Pak Case’, Annex VI in Application Pursuant to Article 173 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community, by Tetra Pak Interna­
tional S.A. against the Commission of the European Communities.
[44] VON WEIZSÄCKER, C. and MORRIS, D., [1991], ‘Assessing Market 
Power’, Annex V in Application Pursuant to Article 173 of the Treaty
124
establishing the European Economic Community, by Tetra Pak Interna­
tional S.A. against the Commission of the European Communities.
125





